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All my life I’ve accumulated memories - they’ve become, in a way, my 
most precious possessions. The night I met my husband, the first time 
I held my textbook in my hands. Having children, making friends, traveling 
the world. Everything I accumulated in life, everything I’ve worked so 
hard for - now all that is being ripped away. As you can imagine, or as 
you know, this is hell. But it gets worse. Who can take us seriously when 
we are so far from whom we once were? Our strange behaviour and 
fumbled sentences change other’s perception of us and our perception 
of ourselves. We become ridiculous, incapable, comic. But this is not who 
we are, this is our disease. And like any disease it has a cause, it has a 
progression, and it could have a cure. 
Julianne Moore as Alice Howland in Still Alice (2014)
As the population continues to age, the number of dementia patients is 
expected to double in the next two decades (Prince et al. 2013; Sosa-
Ortiz et al. 2012). No effective therapy to halt the progress or reverse the 
process of dementia exists yet, and the necessity for research that can 
lead to more effective diagnostic instruments and therapeutic interventions 
for this increasingly prevalent condition is widely recognized (see eg.: 
European Parliament 2011; WHO 2012; Pierce 2010). Dementia patients 
need to be involved in clinical research in order to develop adequate 
medicines for the underlying illnesses (Warner & Nomani 2008; Kim 2011; 
Selkoe 1992). Nonetheless, it is also important that the participation of 
dementia patients in research is based on appropriate consent regimes. 
Patients with dementia, however, face an increased risk of becoming 
incompetent to provide informed consent. In most countries, the legal 
possibilities for doing research with incompetent research subjects are 
limited and require the consent of a legal representative (European 
Directive 2001; Biomedicine Convention 1997). Dementia patients are a 
special population compared to other groups of incompetent research 
subjects, such as children and people with mental disabilities. Dementia 
patients are characterised by the fact that at an earlier stage of their life, 
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they were able to give their consent to participation in research. The often 
slowly progressive nature of dementia raises the possibility for patients 
to anticipate their incompetence. Dementia patients could authorize 
future research participation by signing an Advance Research Directive 
(ARD). In an ARD the dementia patient can describe his1 preferences 
concerning future research participation. This thesis focuses on doing 
research with dementia patients and explores whether ARDs are an 
acceptable authorization tool for this specific population.
Dementia
Dementia affects many people around the world and large amounts of 
resources and money are spent on taking care of people with dementia 
(Prince et al. 2013). It was estimated that 35,6 million people suffered 
from dementia worldwide in 2010 (WHO 2012; Prince et al. 2013). These 
numbers are expected to rise to 65,7 million in 2030 (Prince et al. 2013). 
The median life expectancy, after initial dementia diagnosis, ranges from 
3 to 12 years (Todd et al. 2013). Dementia is a term used to describe 
various symptoms of cognitive decline such as forgetfulness, but is not 
a disease itself. Dementia is a symptom, caused by progressive neuro-
degenerative diseases, of which Alzheimer’s disease is the most well 
known and most widely studied. Dementia is characterized by a gradual, 
progressive change of the brain structure, a change of cognitive functions 
and psychological and behavioural change. In the advanced stages of 
dementia there are profound memory deficits, an inability to recognize 
family members, incontinence, decreased or sparse speech, and depen-
dency in all daily activities, including eating and drinking (McCulloch 
et al. 2013).
Informed consent as a prerequisite in the research context
Informed consent is the gold standard for acquiring a participant’s 
permission to be included in research, and a very important legal and 
moral prerequisite for research participation. Informed consent offers 
the participant the opportunity to weigh the possible benefits against 
the burden and risk of participating. It has a volitional component: the 
research participant must be sufficiently informed, the consent must 
be given voluntary and free from coercion, and a cognitive component: 
the research participant must have the capacity to make the decision at 
hand; he must be competent (Faden & Beauchamp 1986; Beauchamp & 
Childress 2013). 
1    Throughout this 
dissertation I only use
masculine pronouns
for reasons of read-
ability, where is stated 
him, I mean to refer to 
him, her and every-
thing in-between.
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The main problem with performing clinical trials on populations unable 
to give adequate consent such as incapacitated adults, is that these are 
not (fully) capable of deciding whether or not they want to participate in 
research projects and what levels of risk and burden they find acceptable. 
At the same time, conducting biomedical research with these populations 
is necessary to develop proper treatments for them. The on-going chal-
lenge is to find an adequate balance between enabling valuable research 
and protecting participants as well as possible.
(In)Competence
One of the preconditions for providing informed consent is that the 
research participant is competent to decide about research participation. 
The cognitive changes due to dementia cause a decline in everyday 
functioning, and include the loss of decision-making capacities. Decisional 
capacity and competence are sometimes used interchangeably, but 
their meaning differs slightly. Decisional capacities are the capacities 
needed to make a decision. Competence is the dichotomous judgement 
whether the capacities are enough to make the decision at hand. Compe-
tent persons have sufficient decision-making capacities, while incompetent 
persons have insufficient decision-making capacities. It is generally argued 
that competence is a necessary condition for respecting the patient’s auto-
nomy. The concept of competence is closely connected to the concept 
of autonomy, as Beauchamp and Childress (2013, p116) noted: 
“Although autonomy and competence differ in meaning, (autonomy 
meaning self governance, competence meaning the ability to perform a 
task or range of tasks) the criteria of the autonomous person and of the 
competent person are strikingly similar”. 
Competent persons are allowed to make their own decisions, even when 
others agree it is against their own best-interest. Unwise or unpopular 
decisions of autonomous persons also need to be respected. Competence 
is therefore understood to be a judgement about the process of the 
decision, and not about the outcome of the decision. The underlying 
presumption is that the person knows best what is in his interests, and 
is able to decide accordingly. This freedom to make your own decisions 
is not absolute, as only the decisions of competent persons are to be 
respected. It is assumed that when someone can no longer judge what 
is in his interest, he has lost the capacities to make a certain decision, and 
should therefore not be allowed to self-govern.
Karin Jongsma
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Competence has both a descriptive and a normative dimension. The nor-
mative dimension concerns whether or not a person ought to retain his 
right to personal autonomy and how to balance autonomy with protection. 
A moral theory about competence should explain which properties 
distinguish the competent from the incompetent and how we ought to 
treat the competent and incompetent (Freedman 1981; Beauchamp & 
Childress 2013; Charland 2001). The descriptive dimension concerns how 
competence can be measured and assessed. Concepts as autonomy and 
competence are widely discussed in medical ethics and philosophy, not 
only because they are difficult to define with precision (Dworkin 1988; 
Feinberg 1989), but also because these concepts are difficult to use in prac-
tice since we cannot unambiguously ‘measure’ autonomy or competence. 
In medical practice, however, a standard for assessing decisional capacity 
is searched for, because experienced clinicians frequently disagree on 
competency judgements of patients with dementia (Whyte et al. 2004; 
Karlawish et al. 2005). Many efforts have therefore been made to develop 
standard criteria for assessment of decisional capacity. Up until now there 
is no consensus regarding these criteria, which is no wonder if we consider 
that the definition of competence is also still debated. The most influential 
criteria for assessing decision-making capacities have been developed 
from a legal perspective (Appelbaum & Roth 1982; Roth et al. 1977). The 
following subcapacities are according to this standard required for 
decisional-capacity:
1    The capacity to make and express a choice (Grisso & Appelbaum 1998).
2    The capacity to understand information: in order to be capable of 
consenting or refusing, the patient must have some basic understanding 
of what the decision factually is about (Buchanan & Brock 1989). 
3    The capacity to appreciate the nature and significance of the decision 
faced (Grisso & Appelbaum 1998). In order to truly understand the 
decision, the understood facts must also mean something to the 
decision-maker. The subject must understand that it is his decision 
and his life and values that are at stake. 
4   The capacity to reason and rationally use information (Buchanan & 
Brock 1989; Grisso & Appelbaum 1998). The patient should be able 
to process information logically, in accordance with his preferences. 
Several assessment instruments to measure cognitive functioning and 
mental capacity exist, of which the Mac-Arthur Competence test is most 
widely used. Special tools to assess capacity to consent to research exist: 
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the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Clinical Research 
(MacCAT-CR). The MacCAT-CR evaluates decision-making capacity 
using a semi-structured interview customizable to the research protocol 
and contains 21 items assessing four abilities that constitute decisional 
capacity: Understanding (13 items), Appreciation (3 items), Reasoning 
(4 items), and Expression of a Choice (1 item). Each item is scored 0 to 2, 
and higher scores indicate better performance (Appelbaum 2007; 
Appelbaum & Grisso 2001). Other tools exist to assess decisional capacity 
to complete an advance directive (Jacoby & Steer 2007; Fazel 1999; 
Silberfeld et al 1993), and the capacity to direct a proxy (Lui et al. 2014; 
Gregory et al. 2007; Moye et al. 2013). Dementia patients’ scores on 
assessment tests vary considerably (Griffith et al. 2005; Karlawish et al. 
2005). Patients with mild to moderate-stage dementia who lack awareness 
of their diagnosis, symptoms and prognosis, are reported to show signi-
ficant decision-making impairment (Kim et al. 2014; Karlawish et al. 2005). 
These instruments operationalise competence in terms of cognitive 
capacities, but it has been argued that also other elements matter for 
decisional capacity, such as emotional capacities (Charland 2001; 
Berghmans 2000). This shortcoming is acknowledged, even by the makers 
of the MacCAT, but discussion remains whether and how emotional 
capacities should be incomporated in assessment tools. Which capacities 
are necessary in order to assert competence are thus still far from clear. 
Furthermore, these instruments provide a score, but there is no clear 
cut-off point to distinguish the competent from the incompetent. The 
tool provides a score of the patient’s (cognitive) decisional-capacity, but 
the judgment about the patient’s competence remains up to the physician 
(Doorn 2009). Whether a patient is competent or not is thus, also with 
these tools, not an objectively measurable phenomenon (Kim 2006). 
Another point of critique is that the score the patient gets is actually a 
judgement about the appropriateness of his decision and not about his 
capacities (Bielby 2008; Doorn 2009; Banner 2012). The choice for a 
certain criterion in the assessment tool and its assigned scores hinges 
upon how the patient ‘ought to’ react to certain information. This judge-
ment is thus inherently a normative judgement about the decision (Banner 
2012). Competence is thus not an objective or neutral concept that can 
be measured empirically. These points of critique are related to the 
disagreement about the concept of competence and the difficulty to 
operationalize concepts as competence and autonomy. This is also the 
reason why there is no empirical criterion to validate the assessment tools. 
Karin Jongsma
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Instead of searching for new ways to measure competence, it seems more 
reasonable to clarify the concepts of competence and incompetence in 
order to understand what it is that we want to measure. 
Even though most of the assessment tools are widely used in practice, 
medical-ethical questions remain about the use and validity of these tests. 
The association between impaired cognitive functions and decisional 
incapacity remains unclear; and epistemic questions remain: how can we 
know when someone meets the standard for decision-making capacity? 
These questions are prudent in the field of dementia research, but are 
beyond the scope of this thesis.
Current European legal standard for incompetent research subjects
Research involving persons who are incompetent is not prohibited in 
Europe, but subject to additional safeguards. Most regulations and legal 
guidelines make a distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic 
research (de Klerk 2012). Therapeutic research is research that will be of 
(some) direct benefit to the research participant. Non-therapeutic research, 
on the other hand, does not directly benefit research participants. Most 
guidelines accept therapeutic research with incapacitated adults only if 
the research cannot be performed with persons who are capable of giving 
consent (subsidiarity principle) and if the benefits of the research project 
outweigh the risks associated with the research (proportionality principle). 
In research without direct benefit to the incapacitated research participant, 
no more than minimal risk and minimal burden are allowed (Biomedicine 
Convention 1997, Article 17; EU Regulation on Clinical Trials 2014, Article 
31.1.g). Furthermore the consent of a legal representative (or so-called proxy) 
is required when the research participant lacks decisional capacity and 
cannot provide free and informed consent himself (European Directive 
2001; US Code of Federal Regulations 45 CFR 46). The authority of proxy 
consent is derived from the assumption that legal representatives know 
the incapacitated person well and can give voice to the presumed wish of 
the research participants. Some legal guidelines for proxy consent explicitly 
require the legal representative to act on the basis of the patients’ pre-
sumed will (eg. WMO Dutch National law; European Directive 2001). 
The underlying assumption that legal representatives know what the 
incapacitated person would have decided, is however questionable, 
because the proxies’ judgements about their loved ones’ preferences are 
often discordant with the actual decision of the patient (Kim et al. 2013). 
Empirical studies in which legal representatives and patients with mild 
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dementia were interviewed separately about the willingness to participate 
in clinical research trials show that legal representatives are either too 
reluctant to authorize enrolment in clinical trials, or consent to studies 
that do not really correspond to the preferences and values of the persons 
they represent (eg. Stocking et al. 2006; Shalowitz et al. 2006). This 
results in either under-enrolment or over-enrolment in research studies 
(Abdoler & Wendler 2012). 
A more fundamental problem is that decisions made by legal represen-
tatives are not based on the autonomous decision of the research par-
ticipant. Autonomous decision-making requires a competent individual 
exercising his power of self-determination, something that is impossible 
when there is no competent self (Brudney 2009; Kim 2011). Arguably, 
proxies could make decisions that are according to the assumed wishes 
and values of the patient, and make authentic decisions (Brudney 2009). 
Authenticity is however, not the same as self-determination or autonomy. 
Consent by a proxy is thus not a full replacement for the informed consent 
of the research subject.
Advance Research Directives
An Advance Research Directive (ARD) is a tool that gives competent 
individuals the opportunity to express their willingness or objection to 
participate in clinical trials when they are incapacitated. An ARD allows 
a person to give direction to his life for a phase when he no longer has 
the capacities to do so. The moral authority of advance directives is thus 
derived from the principle of respect for the person’s (precedent) auto-
nomy (Davis 2002; Dworkin 1993; Vollmann 2001; Berghmans 2000). 
The benefit of an ARD is that the consent can be based on the well-
considered preferences of the autonomous person before he became 
incompetent to provide informed consent. ARDs also have the potential 
to increase the participation rate of dementia patients in clinical trials, by 
overcoming reluctance of legal representatives to authorize participation 
of incompetent individuals in clinical trials.
A number of American scholars have described the potential utility of 
ARDs to facilitate the involvement of people with cognitive impairment 
in medical research since the end of the 1980s (Levine 1986; NIH 1987; 
NBAC 1998; Moorehouse & Weisstub 1996; Backlar 1998). The NIH allows 
dementia patients in the US to use ARDs even though it is not a legal 
standard. Surveys have however shown that only few people communicate 
Karin Jongsma
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their wishes concerning research participation, whether orally or in writing 
(Abdoler & Wendler 2012; Bravo et al. 2011; Muthappan et al. 2005). In 
Europe ARDs are not commonly used in practice, and the legal status 
is unclear (Lötjönen 2006). Also European domestic laws are virtually 
silent about the possibility of consenting to research participation in the 
event of future mental incapacity. 
The Dutch law concerning research with human research subjects (WMO) 
does not explicitly consider the option to consent to research by using an 
ARD. However, in the parliamentary debate it was remarked that2 1) an 
ARD cannot function as the sole source to authorise research participation, 
and 2) an advance research directive that indicates dissent cannot be 
overruled by the consent of a proxy (NAE, 1995-1996).
Questions and critique concerning advance directives
Advance directives for dementia patients are topic of debate, because 
dementia patients may be incompetent, but remain alert and able to 
have subjective experiences. Dementia patients may express wishes 
that do not conform to, or that contradict earlier expressed preferences 
as formulated in an advance directive. How we interpret the difference 
between the prior preferences and current wishes has important con-
sequences for how we deal with advance directives. There is an extensive 
ethical debate concerning this question in the international literature 
(eg. Dresser 1995; Dworkin 1986; Jaworska 1999; Delaere 2010; Furberg 
2012), and contains very interesting and complex arguments, but are 
beyond the scope of this introduction to discuss into detail. I3 will only 
touch upon the most influential visions and approaches to illustrate 
the problems that advance directives raise. Most arguments within this 
debate are not specific for ARDs, but are used for or against the use of 
advance directives also outside the research context.
Points of criticism include metaphysical questions concerning the identity 
of the dementia patient. The question is posed whether we can rightly 
consider the dementia patient, who radically changes as his disease 
progresses, as the same person that wrote the advance directive. This 
raises questions concerning the concept of personal identity. Parfit’s 
(1984) approach has been influential for this argument. He argues that 
in order to survive as the same person, we should look at psychological 
continuity of the person at different points in time. This criterion maintains 
that in order for a person to be considered the same person, he must be 
2   The original Dutch 
text of the parliamen-
tiary debate concer-
ning ARDs is as follows: 
“Indien een dergelijke 
verklaring zou in-
houden dat de betrok-
kene niet aan onder-
zoek wenst deel te 
nemen, achten wij het 
vanzelfsprekend dat 
die wens wordt ge-
volgd en boven het 
oordeel van de ver-
tegenwoordiger gaat. 
Zou de verklaring 
toestemming voor 
medisch-wetenschap-
pelijk onderzoek 
inhouden, dan achten 
wij het niet goed denk-
baar dat deze toestem-
ming gebaseerd is op 
adequate informatie 
over de aard en 
gevolgen van het 
onderzoek. Aangezien 
ook deze laatste eis 
uit een oogpunt van 
bescherming van de 
proefpersoon van 
cruciaal belang is, 
menen wij dat dan in 
beginsel het oordeel 
van de vertegenwoor-
diger, dat wel op de 
nodige informatie 
gebaseerd kan zijn, 
doorslaggevend is.” 
(NAE, kamerstukken 
II, 1995-1996, 22 588, 
nr 11, p 19)
3   To explicate where I 
refer to my personal 
view I will use ‘I’ and 
where I refer to 
chapters I have written 
with my co-authors, 
I will use ‘we’ in this 
introduction.
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uniquely psychologically continuous. Parfit does however not write about 
dementia, nor about advance directives. Dresser (1986) was the first to 
formulate similar arguments as an objection against the use of advance 
directives, by raising questions about metaphysical identity. This argument
has also been described as the slavery argument (Buchanan 1988) and 
the Someone Else Problem (DeGrazia 1999). It is argued that substantial 
memory loss and other psychological changes may produce a new person, 
who loses connection to the earlier person. This objection questions the 
legitimacy of advance directives, by arguing that it is based on a wrong 
assumption about identity: the person who wrote the advance directive 
should not be considered to be the ‘same’ person as the now demented 
person. An advance directive is only useful as long as you really are you and 
not somebody else. And if the later person is not the same as the person 
who wrote the advance directive, the question is raised why the wishes 
of the earlier person should control what happens to the later person. 
Others have raised epistemic questions concerning the impossibility to 
anticipate a future state of dementia. It is argued that we cannot know 
what we want in the future because our needs and interests will have 
radically changed (Dresser 1986, 1995; Robertson 1991). This objection 
questions why prior preferences must trump the interests of an incom-
petent person’s current wishes. Irrespective of the identity question, 
Dresser and Robertson argue that when there is a conflict between the 
advance directive and the patient’s current interest, we ought to follow 
the latter. 
Dworkin (1986, 1993), on the other hand, has famously argued that desires 
and values that autonomous choosers have, form so-called ‘critical inte-
rests’, and include convictions about what helps to make a good life good 
on the whole. Incompetent persons are not able to generate critical inte-
rests, and only have ‘experiential interests’. Dworkin argues that experien-
tial interests may be overruled by critical interests, therefore the reflected 
wishes as stated in an advance directive should be leading. Jaworska 
(1999) has argued in a similar way, she agrees with Dworkin that critical 
interests should be leading, but she presents a different conception of 
critical interests. Jaworska argues that as long as the person still holds 
values, he is capable of self-governance and can form critical interests. 
She argues, in contrast to Dworkin, that dementia patients are still able 
to hold values and therefore still form critical interests. Her main point 
is that what happens to dementia patients is a change of values and 
Karin Jongsma
18
therefore of critical interests.
Besides these more philosophical objections, practical questions have 
been raised concerning the uptake of advance research directives and the 
usability of ARDs for patients. Advance directives or living wills in the 
care context have been criticised for being only of limited or even no 
clinical use (Fagerlin & Schneider 2004; Hertogh 2011; Gillick 2010; 
Perkins 2007; Kirschner 2005; Rurup et al. 2005; Vezzoni, 2005). One 
study (Muthappan et al. 2005) found that only 11% of adults inpatients 
in a NIH clinical centre completed an ARD. Of these, the majority (76%) 
were willing to participate in research that would admittedly help them, 
while 49% were also willing to take part in research that was not of benefit 
to them and posed only minimal risk. Another study showed that most of 
the 246 potential research subjects were willing to fill out such a directive 
(89% if asked by family, 86% if asked by the doctor), but that only 16% of 
the participants completed an ARD (Wendler et al. 2002). 
SCOPE AND AIMS
As follows from this general introduction, further research concerning 
legal and ethical implications of including people with dementia in bio-
medical research is desirable. It is important to understand the charac-
teristics of this population, the context of doing research with dementia 
patients and the possibility of using advance directives for this population. 
This thesis aims to provide an overview of the important ethical issues 
regarding dementia research and to systematically analyse those issues in 
order to further the debate and specify the implications for clinical practice 
on advance directives in dementia research. The main questions that are 
addressed in this thesis are:
I     What are the morally relevant characteristics of dementia research 
participants?
II    How should opposing former and current wishes of dementia patients 
be understood?
III   Are advance research directives an appropriate means for dementia 
patients to provide research authorization?
METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS
This thesis is intended as a contribution to the field of medical ethics, which 
belongs to the field of applied ethics. The area of applied ethics is often 
distinguished from two other moral philosophical areas: normative ethics 
and meta-ethics. In normative ethics general theories on what makes an 
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action right or wrong, or a person good or bad, are discussed. In meta-ethics 
the meaning of moral terms and the nature of moral judgments, are discussed.
Medical ethics is the study of moral values and judgments in the field 
of health care and the application and development of ethical theories 
for the purpose of giving orientation in medical practice. Medical ethics is 
not a monolithic field; it is field of study that is interdisciplinary by nature. 
It requires a combination of methodologies. To facilitate the interaction 
between theories and practice, we use the method of the ‘reflective 
equilibrium’. The reflective equilibrium approach includes various elements, 
such as relevant background theories, principles, considered moral 
judgments and empirical data (Daniels 1979; Rawls 1971). Philosophical 
theory and clinical or ‘bed-side’ reality are both important sources of know-
ledge for medical ethics, and depending on its more practical or more 
theoretical focus, social empirical knowledge, the legal context and bio-
logical knowledge also matter for providing ethical orientation. Medical 
ethics may concern decisions regarding individual patients, assist in the 
formulation of policies that affect large numbers of people, and may be 
concerned with fundamental questions about, for example, competence 
in health care, advance directives and the attribution of health care 
resources. These levels of medical ethics may seem distinguishable fields, 
however there are no sharp boundaries between them. Medical ethical 
theory can influence reasoning in policy settings, clinical practice can 
prompt the reexamination of basic assumptions and pre-theoretical 
beliefs, or intuitions might have to be revised or refined due to paradigm 
cases (Arras 2007). This is known as a wide reflective equilibrium, in which 
our moral reflections should bring general moral principles and particular 
judgments together in a harmonious way (Daniels 1979; Rawls 1971). If we 
are guided by a method like the reflective equilibrium we should expect 
theory to shed critical light on our responses to cases, but we should 
also expect reflection on cases to shape the principles and theory we 
eventually develop (Beauchamp 1984). 
A combination of research methods is used in this dissertation to allow 
for a broad reflection on how to deal with ARDs in the context of dementia. 
In our publications, my co-authors and I, clarify concepts and incon-
gruences in the current research practices, and the ethical and regulatory 
debate. We analyse normative positions and arguments and in some 
instances I take a normative stance myself. 
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OVERVIEW OF THIS THESIS
In the first section we explore dementia and the research context. This 
section describes what kind of research is conducted in the field of demen-
tia, what the rules are concerning research participation of incompetent 
adults and how changing wishes and prior preferences of dementia 
patients should be dealt with.
Chapter 1 describes which types of dementia research were conducted 
in the Netherlands between 2006 and March 2015. This chapter analyses 
which types of research are conducted and which eligibility criteria are used, 
this in order to get a clearer picture whether the research participants 
represent the general dementia population. It will be argued that both the 
type of research conducted and the research population are not represen-
tative of the larger patient population of people suffering from dementia. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the legal and ethical guidelines applying to research 
with children and dementia patients. These guidelines regulating bio-
medical research contain specific articles regulating research with 
incompetent populations. While some of the available laws and guidelines 
differentiate and set specific requirements for groups of incapacitated 
adults and other specific requirements for children, others do not dif-
ferentiate and set generic requirements for all populations unable to 
consent. This chapter presents an overview and analysis of the requirements 
for doing research with children and dementia patients. Furthermore, it 
is shown to what extent the morally relevant similarities and differences 
between the two groups are represented in ethical guidelines and legal 
documents. 
Chapter 3 discusses how conflicting wishes of dementia patients should 
be understood. Our understanding of this conflict has important conse-
quences for the use of advance directives. Some bioethicists and geronto-
logists have argued that dementia patients undergo a ‘response shift’ 
causing them to change their preferences. In this chapter we show that 
authors who argue that dementia patients undergo a response shift use 
the term imprecisely; and we argue that response shift is not the right 
model to explain what happens to dementia patients. 
The second part of this dissertation focuses on Advance Research 
Directives and will describe what their legal status is in Europe, whether 
researchers are willing to follow the ARDs in practice and to what extent 
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ARDs do provide a morally defensible basis to include dementia patients 
in research trials.
Chapter 4 explores what the common European legal framework on 
biomedical research states concerning ARDs. We analyse the legal 
guidelines of the Council of Europe and the European Union in order to 
understand the place of advance directives in dementia research in the 
current European legal framework. We show that the possibility to use 
ARDs is not explicitly mentioned, but is not forbidden either. Furthermore, 
we show which challenges remain for integrating ARDs into the European 
norms governing biomedical research.
Chapter 5 shows how researchers doing clinical research into dementia 
look upon the introduction of ARDs, what arguments they use to support 
their attitudes and in particular whether they are willing to comply with 
such directives. We focus on the reasons for their opinions, to identify 
which ethical arguments are important to them. The ethical aspects of 
researchers’ judgments and the practical implications of the introduction 
of advance directives in dementia research are described and it is shown 
under which conditions an ARD is useful and valuable in practice. 
Chapter 6 covers the differences between advance directives in the care 
context and the context of research. In this chapter it is argued that 
research participation should not be understood as a Dworkinean ‘critical 
interest’ and that the context of research asks for a different approach to 
advance directives than the context of care. We argue that research partici-
pation is not a critical interest for most people, and that it is better to 
understand advance research directives as a ‘declaration of willingness’.
Chapter 7 analyses whether ARDs form a morally defensible ground 
for including incapacitated dementia patients in research trials. In this 
chapter, the current legal practice of proxy consent is criticized by 
showing that proxy consent does not give voice to the patient’s autonomy. 
It will be argued that ARDs are the better option for authorizing research 
participation, but that there are remaining questions, requiring extra 
protection during the trial in case the incompetent research participant 
is more burdened than anticipated. 
This thesis concludes with a general discussion, which provides a sum-
mary of the conclusions and a general discussion on the contribution of 
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this study to the debate about and the arguments for the use of advance 
directives in dementia research. Furthermore, the implications of the results 
with regard to the role of ARDs for dementia patients are elaborated on.
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ABSTRACT
Children and adults with dementia are vulnerable populations. Both groups 
are also relatively seldom included in biomedical research. However, 
including them in clinical trials is necessary, since both groups are in 
need for scientific innovation and new therapies. Their dependence and 
limited decision-making skills increase their vulnerability, necessitating 
extra precautions when including them in clinical trials. Beside these 
similarities there are also many differences between the groups. The most 
obvious one is that children have an entire life ahead of them and will 
become persons with certain ideals and preferences, while adults with 
dementia have lived a life in which they have expressed their ideals and 
preferences. While some of the available research guidelines recognise 
these differences and set specific requirements for groups of incapacitated 
adults and others for children, other documents do not differentiate and 
only set requirements for subjects unable to consent as a single category 
of subjects. 
In this chapter we analyse to what extent the similarities and differences 
between the two groups are represented in legal documents and ethical 
guidelines. The chapter presents an overview and an analysis of the 
requirements for doing research with children and dementia patients. 
We conclude with suggestions about how to better incorporate the morally 
relevant aspects of these two groups in legislation and ethical guidelines.
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INTRODUCTION
Children start their lives being dependent and without the capacities to 
make decisions. Adults who suffer from dementia, live their lives similarly 
being dependent and having limited decision-making capacities. In 
informal language the analogy between young children and people 
with dementia is frequently referred to. People with dementia are said 
to behave childlike, or to ‘go back to childhood’ (Jonsson et al. 1976; 
Miller et al. 2000). There are, however, profound differences between 
the two groups. The most obvious one being the fact that children have 
an entire life ahead of them and are expected to become persons with 
certain ideals and preferences, while people with dementia have lived 
an entire life and have expressed their ideals and preferences earlier on. 
Children are presumed to be (partly) incompetent by default, while for 
adults it has to be demonstrated that they are incompetent. Moreover, 
dependence on others is normal for children, as well as a temporary state. 
For the elderly dependence on others is a loss after living their lives 
independently. 
One thing children and adults with dementia have in common is that 
medical research is highly needed for them (Caldwell et al. 2004; Selkoe 
1992). For many childhood diseases, as well as for dementia, no effective 
treatment exists and interactions with other medications are often un-
known. Performing clinical trials on these groups is therefore absolutely 
necessary. At the same time the vulnerability of children and of dementia 
patients demands extra precautions when including them as research 
subjects. The available legal documents and ethical guidelines regulating 
biomedical research therefore contain specific articles regulating research 
with incompetent populations. While some of the available laws and 
guidelines differentiate and set specific requirements for groups of 
incapacitated adults and other specific requirements for children, others 
do not differentiate and set generic requirements for all populations 
unable to consent. 
In this paper we will provide an overview of the relevant articles in inter-
national legal documents and ethical guidelines concerning biomedical 
research with children and incapacitated adults. By pointing out the few 
differences and many similarities between protective measures for these 
two groups, we will show that only some of the morally relevant differences 
between the groups are acknowledged in legislation and ethical guidelines. 
Furthermore, we will provide suggestions about how to better incorporate 
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the morally relevant aspects in legislation and ethical guidelines, in order 
to better respect the dignity and well-being of these two groups of 
vulnerable research subjects.
METHODS: ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATION AND ETHICAL GUIDELINES
We selected eight influential legal and ethical documents that set rules 
or guidelines for conducting biomedical research with human subjects, 
and have focused on the articles that refer to subjects who are not able 
to provide informed consent. None of the guidelines state specific rules 
for dementia patients. They are included in the group of incapacitated 
adults, which also includes for example mentally disabled persons and 
persons in a coma. Table 1 shows an overview of the documents that we 
analysed, as well as their scope and legal status.
TABLE 1 OVERVIEW OF ANALYSED DOCUMENTS
Declaration of Helsinki Medical research involving 
human subjects
No legal force, ethical guideline 
of global influence
Directive 2001/20/EC or 
Clinical Trials Directive
Clinical drug trials Legally binding in all EU member 
states after implementation in 
national law
Clinical Trials Regulation Clinical drug trials Directly binding upon all EU 
member states without prior 
implementation. Expected to 
come into force in 2016
European Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine or 
Biomedicine Convention
Full range of research activities 
in the health field involving 
interventions on human beings
Applicable to those member 
states of the Council of Europe 
that have signed and ratified 
the convention
Guideline for Good Clinical 
Practice or ICH GCP guideline
Clinical drug trials International ethical and scientific 
quality standard. No legal force 
directly, but enforceable by 
reference in national laws
International Ethical Guidelines 
for Biomedical Research 
Involving Human Subjects or
CIOMS guidelines
Biomedical research involving 
human subjects
Ethical guideline, no legal force
Medical Research involving 
Human Subjects Act or WMO 
(Dutch abbreviation)
All biomedical research 
involving human subjects, with 
specific requirements for drug 
trials (implementation of the 
Clinical Trials Directive)
National law in the Netherlands
US Code of Federal Regulations Biomedical research involving 
human subjects
National law of the USA, no legal 
force in Europe but influential 
to European policymakers 
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In each document we looked for articles addressing three topics related 
to the incompetence of children and dementia patients, namely 1) require-
ments for the consent procedure and dissent to participation, 2) the 
acceptability of risk and burden, and 3) protection during the trial including 
dissent to continue participation. All documents require that research with 
incompetent research subjects is group-related, meaning that research 
is only possible with this population and cannot be conducted with 
competent subjects. We will not elaborate any further on this requirement 
since it is fairly straightforward and the same in all selected documents. 
OVERVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS IN LEGISLATION AND ETHICAL 
GUIDELINES
Requirements for the consent procedure
The gold standard for acquiring a person’s permission to be included in 
research is informed consent (Beauchamp & Childress 2013). Clearly, 
incompetent persons cannot provide valid informed consent for research 
participation. All analysed documents require consent by a legal represen-
tative if the research subject himself cannot provide informed consent. 
The Dutch WMO and the European Clinical Trials Directive specifically 
mention that the consent of the legal representative should reflect the 
presumed will of the research subject. 
Additional to the consent of the legal representative, assent of the research 
subject is sometimes required. Assent can be understood as the incompetent 
participants agreement to participate in the trial and does not require 
full understanding of the study and the consequences of participation; 
therefore it does not have the same status as informed consent. What 
exactly assent is, is not always clear, as it is formulated diffusely in the 
analysed documents. An explicit or implicit refusal to participate in a trial 
is called dissent. Table 2 shows the relevant articles for the requirements 
for proxy consent, assent and dissent, and their exact wording.
The Declaration of Helsinki requires seeking assent for all groups of 
incompetent research subjects. The ICH GCP states that for all groups 
who cannot provide informed consent ‘the subject should, if capable, 
also sign and personally date the written informed consent’. There is 
no further explanation of the meaning of this requirement, therefore it 
remains unclear whether this should be considered as assent. The other 
documents differentiate between incapacitated adults and children. Only 
some of the documents ask for the child’s assent when possible (Biomedicine 
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Convention, CIOMS, WMO, US Code of Federal Regulations). The CIOMS 
guidelines, the Biomedicine Convention and the US Code of Federal 
Regulations recognise the growing capacities and maturity of children 
throughout their childhood. Moreover the US Code of Federal Regulations 
states that the assent should actively be given and not merely result 
from failure to object. The Clinical Trials Directive and the Clinical Trials 
Regulation both set specific requirements for the adaption of information 
about the trial to the age and level of maturity of children, by investigators 
trained or experienced in working with children. The Clinical Trials Regula-
tion and the CIOMS guidelines require that in case the minor reaches the 
age of legal competence to give informed consent during the research 
trial, informed consent then has to be obtained from them.
Regarding incompetent elderly, the documents that do differentiate 
between children and incapacitated adults, have the prerequisite that the 
incapacitated adult takes part in the authorisation process as far as possible 
(Biomedicine Convention) or according to his capabilities (CIOMS guide-
lines). Both the Clinical Trials Directive and the Clinical Trials Regulation 
state that research with incapacitated subjects is ‘only allowed if they 
have given, or have not refused to give, informed consent before the 
onset of their incapacity’. This can be interpreted as having to respect 
the wish of the research participant who was formerly competent to 
consent or to dissent to research participation. That would imply that 
this requirement is only set for adults who previously have been able to 
make competent decisions and not for adults who have never been 
competent in the first place. In addition, the Clinical Trials Regulation 
states that ‘incapacitated adults will receive information about the trial 
in view of their capacity to understand it’ and that ‘the subject shall as 
far as possible take part in the informed consent procedure’. Interestingly, 
both the Dutch WMO and the US Code of Federal Regulations differentiate 
between children and incapacitated adults, and require the assent of 
children, but not of incapacitated adults.
With respect to dissent to refuse research participation, the Declaration of 
Helsinki states that dissent should be respected. This requirement applies 
to all groups of incompetent research subjects. The Clinical Trials Directive 
states that the explicit wish of both a minor and of an incapacitated adult 
‘who is capable of forming an opinion and assessing this information to 
refuse participation [..] from the clinical trial [..] is considered by the 
investigator or where appropriate the principal investigator’. In the Clinical 
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Trials Regulation the wording was changed from ‘considered’ to ‘respected’. 
The CIOMS guidelines state that a child’s refusal to participate should always 
be respected, while it states for incapacitated adults that in exceptional 
cases the refusal to participate may be overruled.
TABLE 2 REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CONSENT PROCEDURE
CONSENT BY A 
LEGAL 
REPRESENTATIVE
ASSENT/DISSENT 
OF MINOR
ASSENT/DISSENT 
OF INCAPACITATED 
ADULTS
Declaration of Helsinki Informed consent from 
the legally authorized 
representative art. 27
When able to, assent 
[..] dissent should be 
respected art. 29
When able to, assent 
[..] dissent should be 
respected art. 29
ICH GCP Consent by the subject’s 
legally acceptable
Representative art. 
4.8.8
The subject should, 
if capable also sign 
and personally date 
the written informed 
consent art. 4.8.12
The subject should, 
if capable also sign 
and personally date 
the written informed 
consent art. 4.8.12
Clinical Trials Directive The informed consent of 
the legal representative 
has been obtained; 
consent must represent 
the subject’s presumed 
will art. 4a & 5a
The explicit wish of a 
minor who is capable 
of forming an opinion 
and assessing this 
information to refuse 
participation [..] is 
considered by the 
investigator or where 
appropriate the princi-
pal investigator art. 4c
Inclusion in clinical 
trials of incapacitated 
adults who have not 
given or not refused 
informed consent 
before the onset of 
their incapacity art. 5
The informed consent 
of the legal represen-
tative has been obtained; 
consent must represent 
the subject’s presumed 
will [..] art. 5a
The explicit wish of a 
subject who is capable 
of forming an opinion 
and assessing this 
information to refuse 
participation [..] is 
considered by the 
investigator or where 
appropriate the principal 
investigator art. 5c
Clinical Trials 
Regulation
Consent by a legal 
representative art. 31.1a 
& art 32.1a
The minors have received 
the information about 
the trial in a way 
adapted to their age 
and mental maturity 
and from investigators 
or members of the 
investigating team who 
are trained or experi-
enced in working with 
children art. 32.1b
Research with incapa-
citated subjects is only 
allowed if they have 
not given, or have not 
refused to give, informed 
consent before the 
onset of their incapacity 
art. 31
53
Chapter II
The minor shall take 
part in the informed 
consent procedure in 
a way adapted to his 
or her age and mental 
maturity art. 32.2
In case the minor 
reaches the age of 
legal competence to 
give informed consent, 
during the research trial 
his or her express in-
formed consent has to 
be obtained art. 33.2
The incapacitated sub-
jects have received the 
information about the 
trial in a way adapted in 
view of their capacity 
to understand it art. 
31.1b
The subject shall as far 
as possible take part in 
the informed consent 
procedure art. 31.3
Biomedicine 
Convention
Authorisation by a 
legal representative 
art. 6.2 & 6.3
The opinion of the 
minor shall be taken 
into consideration 
as an increasingly 
determining factor in 
proportion to his or 
her age and degree of 
maturity art. 6.2
The individual concer-
ned shall as far as 
possible take part 
in the authorisation 
procedure art. 6.3
CIOMS guidelines Consent by a parent or 
legal representative is 
given Guidelines 14 & 15
If such research sub-
jects, including children, 
become capable of 
giving independent
informed consent 
during the research, 
their consent to con-
tinued participation 
should be obtained 
Guideline 9
Agreement of each child 
has been obtained to t
he extent of the child’s 
capabilities Guideline 14
The consent of each 
subject has been 
obtained to the extent 
of that person’s capa-
bilities. Guideline 15
WMO Written consent of the 
subject’s parents or 
legal guardian art. 6.1.c
The substitute consent 
[..] must represent the 
presumed will of the 
subject art. 6.3
Assent is required only 
if child is older than 12 
years of age art. 6.1b
US Code of Federal 
Regulations
The investigator has 
obtained the legally 
effective informed 
consent of the subject 
or the subject’s legally 
authorized representa-
tive 45 CFR 46.116
Adequate provisions 
are made for soliciting 
the permission of 
each child’s parents 
or guardian 45 CFR 
§46.408
Children capable of 
assenting must also 
express their willingness 
to participate 45 CFR 
§46.408
Failure to object 
should not, absent 
affirmative agreement, 
be construed as assent 
45 CFR 46.402(b)
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ACCEPTABILITY OF RISKS AND BURDEN
To protect incompetent populations against disproportionate harm, 
specific protective rules regarding the acceptability of risk and burden 
in research trials have been formulated. The concept of risk is understood 
to refer to the combination of the probability and magnitude of some 
future harm (IRB Guidebook 1993). A distinction can be made between 
research offering a direct benefit to the participant (therapeutic), and 
research that is unlikely to provide any direct benefit to the participant 
(non-therapeutic). If the research is non-therapeutic, the general idea is 
that the research should contain no more than minimal risks and burden. 
If the research is therapeutic, all documents state that the benefits must 
outweigh the risks, as they also do for therapeutic research with competent 
adults. The requirement that research can be justified on the basis of a 
favourable risk/benefit assessment bears a close relation to the principle 
of beneficence (Beauchamp & Childress 2013). 
Table 3 shows how exactly the requirements for accepting risks and 
burden in non-therapeutic trials are formulated. Most, though not all, 
documents allow for non-therapeutic research with incompetent subjects 
when the risks and burden are no more than minimal. The Clinical Trials 
Directive, however, does not make any distinction between therapeutic 
and non-therapeutic research and thereby does not set any upper limit 
for risk and burden for non-therapeutic research with children. All it 
requires is minimisation of risk and burden. For incapacited adults how-
ever, research should either have a prospect of direct benefit to the group 
of patients, or, in case no such benefit is expected, produce no risk at all. 
It remains unclear why the distinction between therapeutic and non-
therapeutic research only applies to incapacitated adults and not to 
children, as well as why, compared to research with incapacitated adults, 
higher levels of risk and burden would be acceptable for research with 
children. 
Some documents (the Declaration of Helsinki, the Clinical Trials Regulation 
and the Biomedicine Convention) allow for non-therapeutic research with 
incompetent participants when the risk and burden are no more than 
minimal. Similar requirements, such as negligible risk, minimised and low 
risk and a minor increase over minimal risk are found in other documents
(WMO, ICH-GCP, US Code of Federal Regulations). The exact wording 
can be found in table 3. The US Code of Federal Regulations does not 
provide any protective upper risk limits for research with incapacitated 
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adults (while it does for minors). On the contrary, the Clinical Trials Directive 
sets stricter rules with respect to risks and burden for non-therapeutic 
research with incapacitated adults than for research with children. Research 
with incapacitated adults is only allowed when there is a prospect of 
benefit outweighing the risks or when it produces no risk at all.
Children and dementia patients are both vulnerable populations with 
limited decision-making capacities. It remains unclear what the basis 
would be for accepting different levels of risks and burden for the two 
groups of research subjects, as the Clinical Trials Directive and the US 
Code of Federal Regulations do. In our view, there are no relevant differen-
ces between these groups that could justify these differences in accepting 
risks and burden.
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TABLE 3 REQUIREMENTS FOR NON-THERAPEUTIC 
RESEARCH
CHILDREN INCAPACITATED ADULTS
Declaration of Helsinki Minimal risk and minimal 
burden art. 28
Minimal risk and minimal 
burden art. 28
ICH GCP The foreseeable risks to the 
subjects are low art. 4.8.14.b
Negative impact on persons 
well-being is minimized and 
low art. 4.8.14.c
The foreseeable risks to the 
subjects are low art. 4.8.14.b
Negative impact on persons 
well-being is minimized and 
low art. 4.8.14.c
Clinical Trials Directive Some direct benefit for the 
group of patients is obtained 
from the clinical trial [..] art. 4e
There are grounds for expect-
ing that administering the 
medicinal product to be tested 
will produce [..] or produce no 
risk at all art. 5i
Clinical Trials Regulation Minimal risk and minimal 
burden art. 32.g.ii
Minimal risk and minimal 
burden art. 32.g.ii
Biomedicine Convention Minimal risk and minimal 
burden art. 17.ii
Minimal risk and minimal 
burden art. 17.ii
CIOMS guidelines Risks are no more likely and 
not greater than the risk 
attached to routine medical or 
psychological examination of 
such persons. Slight or minor 
increases above such risk may 
be permitted when there is an 
overriding scientific or medical 
rationale for such increases 
and when an ethical review 
committee has approved them 
Guideline 9
Risks are no more likely and 
not greater than the risk 
attached to routine medical or 
psychological examination of 
such persons. Slight or minor 
increases above such risk may 
be permitted when there is an 
overriding scientific or medical 
rationale for such increases 
and when an ethical review 
committee has approved them 
Guideline 9
WMO Negligible risks and minimal 
burden art. 4
Negligible risks and minimal 
burden art. 4
US Code of Federal 
Regulations
Minimal risks (§46.404) or the 
exception of a slight or minimal 
increase over minimal risk 
(§46.406)
PROTECTION DURING THE TRIAL - MONITORING AND WITHDRAWAL
Competent research subjects always have the possibility to withdraw 
their consent at any time, for whatever reason. Incompetent research 
subjects do not have this option, as they could not consent in the first 
place. They therefore depend on others for protecting their well-being 
during the trial. In this paragraph we discuss protective measures that 
aim to safeguard the well-being of incompetent subjects during the 
performance of the trial. They can roughly be categorised into monitoring 
the risk and burden and the obligation to withdraw a subject from a 
57
Chapter II
trial when necessary. If the subject is capable of expressing his wish to 
discontinue participation, in other words objects to further participation, 
this wish should be respected; in the guidelines this is also called dissent. 
Dissent in this context means ‘the wish to discontinue participation’ and 
is not the opposite of consent or assent prior to inclusion. The measures 
being discussed in this paragraph appeal to the principles of respect for 
autonomy (even if this autonomy is underdeveloped or partly diminished) 
and of non-maleficence (Beauchamp & Childress 2013). Table 4 shows 
the articles relating to these two categories.
The need for monitoring the risks and burden for research subjects seems 
to be obvious and important (ICH GCP, Clinical Trials Directive, Clinical 
Trials Regulation, WMO), however, not all analysed documents have explicit 
rules for this. In order to provide sufficient protection for vulnerable 
research subjects, one needs to be sure that the level of risks and burden 
does not exceed the level that was found acceptable during the reviewing 
procedure. Only the ICH GCP guidelines state explicitly what the conse-
quence of monitoring should be. Namely, subjects should be withdrawn 
if they appear unduly distressed. Monitoring should aim to protect the 
research subject against unexpected disproportionate harm. Withdrawing 
subjects who are unduly harmed or distressed, thus seems to be a logical 
consequence.
Most documents set requirements for subjects who want to discontinue 
their participation in research. The Declaration of Helsinki stipulates that 
dissent should be respected. The Biomedicine Convention phrases this 
slightly differently, mentioning that research may only be performed when 
‘the subject does not object’. Further elaboration on how to interpret 
‘objection’ is lacking. The Dutch WMO states for both incapacitated adults 
and children that, should they ‘object [..] the person in question will be 
excluded from participation’. How to respond to signs of objection is 
written in accompanying codes of conduct. There are separate codes 
for research with children, with incapacitated elderly persons and with 
mentally disabled persons (CCMO 2002a, 2002b, 2002c). The US Code 
of Federal Regulations itself has no requirements of this kind, but the 
accompanying guidebook for IRBs states that the child’s dissent should 
normally be respected. Only in cases of ‘research that offers the child 
the possibility of a direct benefit that is important to the health or well-
being of the child and is available only in the context of the research, 
[..] a child’s dissent, which should normally be respected, may be overruled 
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by the child’s parents, at the IRB’s discretion (IRB Guidebook 1993).
The Clinical Trials Directive states that the explicit wish of a minor and 
incapacitated subject ‘who is capable of forming an opinion and assessing 
information to refuse participation or to be withdrawn from the clinical 
trial at any time is considered by the investigator or where appropriate 
the principal investigator’. In the Clinical Trials Regulation the wording is 
changed from ‘considered’ to ‘respected’, which makes the requirement 
slightly stricter. Only the CIOMS guidelines differentiate between require-
ments for children and incapacitated adults. Whereas the CIOMS guidelines 
state that a child’s refusal to continue participation should always be respec-
ted, the CIOMS guidelines do allow overruling refusal of incapacitated adults 
in exceptional cases. It remains unclear on what ground this differentiation 
is based. 
TABLE 4 PROTECTION DURING THE TRIAL
MONITORING WITHDRAWAL
Declaration of Helsinki The potential subjects dissent 
should be respected art. 29
ICH GCP Subjects in these trials should be 
particularly closely monitored 
and should be withdrawn 
if they appear to be unduly 
distressed art. 4.8.14
Subjects in these trials should 
be particularly closely monitored 
and should be withdrawn if 
they appear to be unduly 
distressed art. 4.8.14
Clinical Trials Directive The risk threshold and degree 
of distress are closely monitored 
art. 3g
The explicit wish of a minor/
incapacitated subject who is 
capable of forming an opinion 
and assessing information, to 
refuse participation or to be 
withdrawn from the clinical 
trial at any time is considered 
by the investigator or where 
appropriate the principal 
investigator art. 4c & 5c
Clinical Trials Regulation The risk threshold and the 
degree of distress are specifically 
defined in the protocol and 
constantly monitored art. 28.1.e
The explicit wish of an incapac-
itated subject / minor who is 
capable of forming an opinion 
and assessing information 
referred to in Article 29(2), to 
refuse participation in, or to 
withdraw from, the clinical trial 
at any time, is respected by 
the investigator’ or where 
appropriate the principal inves-
tigator art. 31.1c & 32.1c
Biomedicine Convention The person concerned does 
not object art. 17.1.v
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CIOMS guidelines For children: Refusal to partici-
pate or continue participation 
should always be respected 
Guideline 14
For incapacitated adults: a 
prospective subject’s refusal to 
participate in research is
always respected, unless, in 
exceptional circumstances, 
there is no reasonable medical 
alternative and local law per-
mits overriding the objection 
Guideline 15
WMO The risk threshold and the degree 
of distress have to specially 
defined and constantly moni-
tored’ art. 13.e.c, only for clinical 
trials
Should an incompetent research 
subject object to the treatment 
administered or behavioural 
strategy imposed, the person 
in question will be excluded 
from participation art. 4.2
US Code of Federal 
Regulations
In cases of research that offers 
the child the possibility of a 
direct benefit that is important 
to the health or well-being of 
the child and is available only 
in the context of the research, 
[..] a child’s dissent, which 
should normally be respected, 
may be overruled by the child’s 
parents, at the IRB’s discretion’ 
IRB guidebook chapter 6
DISCUSSION
The wide variety of requirements found in legal and ethical guidelines 
concerning medical research with vulnerable groups of research subjects, 
shows that the morally relevant particularities of the different groups are 
not always acknowledged. Children and dementia patients are morally 
similar in some respects, but very different in others. Table 5 shows which 
documents differentiate between children and adults and which documents 
do not. Besides some noteworthy differences between the groups of 
incapacitated adults and children, we have seen that there are a great 
number of legal documents and ethical guidelines with a variety of rules 
for conducting research with groups of incompetent participants. The 
variation in these documents may hinder the guiding function these 
documents aim to provide. Both ethical guidance of research trials and 
the adequate protection of research subjects are not served by a variety 
of requirements.
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TABLE 5 LEGAL DOCUMENTS AND ETHICAL GUIDELINES 
WITH SIMILAR AND DIFFERENT REQUIREMENTS 
FOR CHILDREN AND INCAPACITATED ADULTS.
DOCUMENTS THAT SET 
DIFFERENT REQUIREMENTS 
FOR CHILDREN AND 
INCAPACITATED ADULTS
DOCUMENTS THAT SET 
THE SAME REQUIREMENTS 
FOR CHILDREN AND 
INCAPACITATED ADULTS, 
OR MAKE NO DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS
Assent Clinical Trials Directive
Clinical Trials Regulation
Biomedicine Convention
WMO
US Code of Federal Regulations
Declaration of Helsinki
ICH GCP 
CIOMS guidelines
Acceptability of risks and 
burden in non-therapeutic trials
Clinical Trials Directive
US Code of Federal Regulations
Declaration of Helsinki
ICH GCP
Clinical Trials Regulation
Biomedicine Convention
CIOMS guidelines
WMO
Monitoring burden ICH GCP
Clinical Trials Directive
Clinical Trials Regulation
WMO
Withdrawal / dissent CIOMS guidelines
US Code of Federal Regulations
Declaration of Helsinki
ICH GCP 
Clinical Trials Directive
Clinical Trials Regulation
Biomedicine Convention
WMO
Similarities
Children and dementia patients both form vulnerable populations. They 
have reduced capacities to protect themselves from harm, and deserve 
additional protection against disproportionate harm in research. Beside 
their vulnerability they share the characteristic of having limited decision-
making capacity. Their (partial) incapacity to make decisions is, however, 
not a permanent condition. The gradual process of either gaining or 
loosing autonomy is an important similarity between the two groups. 
For both children and dementia patients, there is a phase in which they 
are not yet, or not anymore, fully capable of deciding about research 
participation. People in a state of partial incapacity to decide need 
guidance or assistance in decision-making. Requiring proxy consent 
combined with the assent of the person concerned for participation in 
research would respect this state of partial decision making incapacity. 
In our overview we showed that respect for the gradual process of gaining 
or loosing autonomy is expressed in some, but not all discussed documents. 
We argue that a phase of shared decision making is equally important 
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and feasible for subjects who loose their decision-making capacity, as 
it is for subjects who are gaining competence, and that it should be a 
requirement for the research participation of both children and incapaci-
tated adults.
With respect to the acceptability of risk and burden, there is no good 
reason for not providing elderly patients with the same level of protection 
as children. With respect to respect for dissent, one could even argue that 
signs of resistance and expressions of dissent should be taken more 
seriously in dementia patients than in children. Children are dependent 
beings by default, and are used to have decisions being taken for them, 
whereas elderly people might experience embarrassment and humiliation 
when things do not go according to their choice and their wish is not 
taken seriously enough. Such differences between children and dementia 
patients are morally relevant when it comes to how to treat them as research 
subjects, but are not represented in any of the analysed documents. 
Differences
Despite the similarities between the two groups, there are also profound 
differences that are morally relevant. In our view, the most important 
difference is the fact that children have not yet (fully) formed preferences 
and wishes, whereas dementia patients have formerly lived independent 
lives and have had the chance to express their wishes earlier on. Inter-
estingly, only two of the documents we analysed have a special requirement 
that appeals to the prior wishes of incapacitated adults. Only the European 
Clinical Trials Regulation and the European Clinical Trials Directive require 
that the incapacitated adult has given or not refused to give informed 
consent before the onset of their incapacity. Possibly this is because 
there are no specific articles concerning dementia patients, as they fall 
under the broader category of incapacitated adults. We recommend 
taking into account formerly expressed wishes of dementia patients when 
possible, for example by means of advance directives specified for research 
participation. Dementia patients differ from some other groups of in-
competent adults, for example mentally disabled persons, who have 
never been competent. It might be unfeasible to set requirements that 
do justice to the particularities of all groups of incapacitated adults. In 
order to respect the past autonomy of dementia patients, it is however 
necessary to treat them as a separate group, not as a part of the larger 
group of incapacitated adults or of incompetent persons in general (which 
also includes children).
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Children are in the process of becoming autonomous beings, and should 
be treated as such. Even though their growing capacities are recognised 
by requiring assent when possible, only two of the documents require the 
consent of the child as soon as it reaches the legal age of competence. 
However, in long-term research studies, children may become competent 
during the study. From the discussed documents, only the Clinical Trials 
Regulation and the CIOMS guidelines require explicitly that a child should 
be asked for his/her consent when (s)he becomes competent during the 
trial. This may be a relatively rare situation, but it is nonetheless important 
to assure correct consent practices in these cases as well. We recommend 
that legislation and guidelines require the consent process to be repeated 
once a participating child reaches legal age during the performance of 
the research study. 
We have shown that children and dementia patients are morally similar 
in some respects, and different in others. These particularities should be 
reflected in legal documents and ethical guidelines concerning biomedical 
research. In our view, the extra protective measures we suggest, contribute 
to better respecting the morally relevant particularities of both groups 
of research subjects. 
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ABSTRACT
The possibility of using advance directives to prospectively consent to 
research participation in the case of dementia remains largely unexplored 
in Europe. Moreover, the legal status of advance directives for research 
is unclear in the European regulations governing biomedical research. 
This chapter explores the place that advance research directives have in 
the current European legal framework, and considers the possibility of 
integrating them more explicitly into the existing regulations. Special 
focus is placed on issues regarding informed consent, the role of proxies, 
and the level of acceptable risks and burdens.
CHAPTER 4
ADVANCE RESEARCH 
DIRECTIVES: THE 
EUROPEAN LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 
—
Based on (Slightly 
modified in style and 
syntax)
Andorno R, Gennet 
E, Jongsma KR and 
Elger B. (2016). 
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, significant efforts have been made in Europe to 
promote patients’ self-determination. An important step in this direction 
was the explicit support given by the Council of Europe and several 
European countries to the use of advance directives to specify health care 
preferences in case of future incapacity (Andorno et al. 2009; Andorno 
2012). In contrast, the possibility of using advance directives to prospectively 
consent to research participation remains largely unexplored in Europe. 
Moreover, applicable legal instruments are virtually silent about the use of 
advance directives in the research context. However, despite the current 
regulatory vacuum, the use of advance research directives (ARDs) is 
gradually drawing interest among scholars (Lötjönen 2006; Pierce 2010; 
Helmchen 2012; Jongsma & van de Vathorst 2015a). In addition, non-govern-
mental organisations promoting the care of patients suffering from demen-
tia have, in recent years, given their explicit support to the use of ARDs, 
provided that certain safeguards are in place (Alzheimer Europe 2009). 
ARDs can serve as a useful tool for patients in the early stage of dementia 
who are still capable of consenting to research participation. These docu-
ments allow them to express their preferences about their participation 
in future or on-going clinical trials should they lose decision-making capa-
city. Without such directives, family members are placed in the difficult 
role of having to make a decision based on the presumed wishes of the 
patient or on the assessment of his or her best interests, which are not 
obvious when no direct benefit is expected. Several studies show that 
proxies cannot reliably predict patients’ preferences: they are either too 
reluctant to authorise their enrolment in clinical trials, or consent to studies 
that do not really correspond to the preferences and values of the persons 
they represent (Stocking et al. 2006). 
The current situation is challenging since there is a crucial need to conduct 
research involving dementia patients to better understand the conditions 
that cause dementia (in particular Alzheimer’s disease), and to develop 
more effective therapeutic or preventive measures. Dementia is at present 
one of the greatest global health challenges as the number of people 
suffering from this condition worldwide is estimated at 44 million and is 
set to almost double by 2030 (Alzheimer’s Disease International 2014). 
Rates increase significantly with age, as dementia affects 5 per cent of 
the population older than 65 and 25-50 per cent of those older than 85 
(Yodofsky & Hales 2008).
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The moral advantage of ARDs, if compared to the current practice of proxy 
consent, is that participants themselves, while still competent, provide 
their consent to research participation. This possibility can be regarded 
as a mechanism of empowerment (Pierce 2010). Like advance directives 
for health care, advance directives for research can be justified on the 
grounds that they offer a tool for prospective self-determination to those
individuals who anticipate incapacity: if autonomous choices regarding 
one’s own healthcare can be applied beyond one’s competence, why 
should it be different for participation in clinical trials? From a more 
practical perspective, ARDs have the advantage of helping to solve 
the problem posed by the lack of information about the willingness of 
dementia patients to be enrolled in clinical trials. ARDs can facilitate the 
task of proxies in making decisions, while ensuring a greater respect for 
the personal preferences and values of participants (Abdoler & Wendler 
2012). These documents also have the potential to increase the partici-
pation of dementia patients in clinical trials and consequently, contribute 
to the development of specific treatments for this group of people.
It should be noted that it is beyond the scope of this article to address the 
philosophical objection, sometimes levelled against advance directives, 
that there is no continuity of identity before and after the onset of demen-
tia (Dresser 1995). We assume, as legal norms do, that people affected by 
dementia should still be regarded as the same persons they were before 
the onset of the cognitive impairment, no matter how serious their loss 
of memory or cognitive capacities. 
This chapter continues by exploring the place that ARDs have in the 
European legal framework governing biomedical research. The discussion 
then proceeds to consider the possibility of integrating them more explicitly 
into the existing European norms. The central questions addressed in the 
article are: What is the legal status of ARDs in Europe? What possibilities 
does the European legal framework offer for using ARDs? In addressing 
these questions, special focus is placed on issues regarding informed 
consent, the role of proxies, and the level of acceptable risks and burdens.
EUROPEAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ARDS
The concept of advance directives for research has been discussed in 
the US since the end of the 1980s (Levine 1986; NIH 1987; NBAC 1998). 
Some American scholars have emphasized the potential utility of these 
documents to facilitate research involving people with mental disorders 
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(Moorehouse & Weisstub 1996; Backlar 1998). As a result of these dis-
cussions, several proposals for the regulation of ARDs have been made 
(Pierce 2010). In Canada, the regulations governing research involving 
human subjects make explicit mention of advance directives for research 
(Canadian Institutes of Health Research 2014). In contrast, no proposals 
for guidelines or legislation in this area have been brought forward in 
Europe, and the European literature on ARDs is almost non-existent. The 
legal frameworks on biomedical research adopted by European bodies, 
namely the Council of Europe and the European Union, are ambiguous 
in this respect (Lötjönen 2006). Similarly, European domestic laws are 
virtually silent about the possibility of consenting to research participation 
in the event of future mental incapacity. 
It is important to stress that research involving persons unable to consent 
is not per se prohibited in Europe, but subject to additional safeguards, 
such as the requirement that the research poses no more than minimal 
risk and minimal burden to participants in circumstances where no direct 
benefit to them is expected, that the legally authorised representatives 
give their consent, and that the research protocol is approved by an 
independent ethics committee. The legal basis for such safeguards can 
be found in the 1997 European Convention on Human Rights and Bio-
medicine, and in the 2014 EU Regulation on Clinical Trials, which will 
replace the currently applicable 2001 EU Clinical Trials Directive in 2016.
Council of Europe
The Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
1997 (hereinafter, Biomedicine Convention) includes only one provision 
relating to advance directives, which stipulates that ‘[t]he previously 
expressed wishes relating to a medical intervention by a patient who is 
not, at the time of the intervention, in a state to express his or her wishes 
shall be taken into account.’ It is important to point out that this provision 
was exclusively developed in relation to advance directives for health care. 
The Convention’s drafters did not have in mind the use of these documents 
for research purposes. This is clear not only from the Explanatory Report 
to the Convention, which in its commentary on Article 9 refers to the 
‘patient’ and the ‘practitioner,’ but also from the fact that Section V of 
the Convention, which specifically deals with biomedical research, does 
not mention the possibility of making advance directives in this context. 
Interestingly, the Convention does not say anything about positive 
advance directives for research. But it can be argued that refusals to 
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participate in research, made either before or after the onset of the 
mental incapacity, would be binding. This can be inferred from Article 
17.1(v), which enumerates, among the conditions for conducting research 
involving persons unable to consent, that ‘the person concerned does 
not object’. 
In comparison to the Biomedicine Convention, the Convention’s Additional 
Protocol on Biomedical Research 2005 takes a step towards the recog-
nition of ARDs. Article 15, 1.iv indirectly refers to ARDs stipulating that the 
consent of the legal representative must be given ‘taking into account 
the person’s previously expressed wishes or objections’. This means that 
although prior wishes -including written wishes and objections- are 
regarded by the Protocol as relevant, they are not accepted as a stand-alone 
solution. Instead, a kind of double safeguard mechanism for the protection 
of incapacitated research subjects is suggested. Therefore, the previously 
expressed wishes have to be assessed by the proxy, who can eventually 
overrule them (as they need only to be ‘taken into account’, and not strictly 
followed). Indeed, these instructions seem to be considered as an element
that might complete the consent given by the legal representative of the 
incapable person, as opposed to an independent basis for the decision, 
and not as instructions documents that can operate independently. When 
such documents exist, the decision of the legal representative cannot 
be exclusively based on his or her own personal opinion, but should be 
guided by the preferences expressed by the individual before the onset 
of the incapacity. 
European Union
At the level of the European Union, the Clinical Trials Directive (2001) 
refers only indirectly to ARDs. Article 5 reads: ‘In the case of other persons 
incapable of giving informed legal consent, all relevant requirements listed 
for persons capable of giving consent shall apply. In addition to these 
requirements, inclusion in clinical trials of incapacitated adults who have 
not given or not refused informed consent before the onset of their in-
capacity shall be allowed only if…’ [the list of additional requirements 
follows]. Since advance consent to participation in research is only men-
tioned in passing as a negative condition for the application of the general 
rules for conducting research involving incapacitated persons, it is hard 
to draw from this norm any positive conclusion about the general condi-
tions for making ARDs and about their efficacy. Therefore, it seems 
excessive to deduce from this provision that ‘the effect of a valid previously 
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given informed consent or refusal is that the potential research participant 
is legally treated as a competent research subject and therefore, the ad-
ditional safeguards listed in the latter part of Article 5 (including consent 
given by a legal representative) need not be applied.’
In April 2014, a new Regulation on Clinical Trials was adopted by the EU 
to replace the Clinical Trials Directive (2001). The Regulation, which will 
become directly applicable to Member States no earlier than on May 2016, 
uses almost the same wording as the 2001 Directive to refer -indirectly- 
to ARDs in Article 31. The only novelty of the new Regulation in this regard 
concerns research in emergency situations and the need for the researcher 
to ensure that the potential participant has not previously expressed 
objections to participate in the clinical trial (Article 35, d). However, 
advance directives as envisaged by the Regulation, expressing a wish not 
to be involved in specific emergency trials, seem very unlikely. Therefore, 
it is difficult to draw from this provision any conclusions that could be 
applicable to advance consent to clinical trials in the event of mental 
incapacity. 
In short, the current European legal framework neither explicitly mentions 
the possibility of using ARDs nor forbids them. Concerning domestic 
regulations, the Swiss Law on Research Involving Human Beings 2011 is, 
to our knowledge, the only legal instrument in Europe that explicitly 
refers to the possibility of using advance directives to prospectively 
consent to medical research. The UK Mental Capacity Act 2005, covering 
England and Wales, mentions ARDs only as a means for objection for 
involvement in research, as it stipulates that research on incapacitated 
persons cannot be performed if, among other things, it is contrary to 
‘an advance decision of his which has effect’. The following section will 
discuss the conditions for integrating advance research directives into 
the European legal framework governing biomedical research. 
CHALLENGES FOR INTEGRATING ARDS INTO THE EUROPEAN LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK
On the one hand, the need for some common European requirements for 
the validity of consent to research participation (including dementia 
research) is undeniable. Although only 24 per cent of all clinical trials 
applied for in the EU are conducted in more than one Member State, 
they involve approximately 67 per cent of all subjects enrolled in clinical 
trials. This is to say that in Europe the majority of trials involving a large 
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number of research subjects are multinational (EU Commission 2012). 
On the other hand, when aiming at a regional consensus on the use of 
ARDs it should be acknowledged that these documents raise a variety 
of ethical and legal questions, especially regarding informed consent, 
the role of proxies, and the level of acceptable risks and burdens. These 
three topics are discussed in this section. 
Informed Consent
In general, participation in clinical trials is subject to stringent conditions 
and additional safeguards that do not apply to health care. These specific 
requirements are understandable because clinical trials do not generally 
aim to improve the health of research participants, but are primarily 
conducted to gain scientific knowledge that can potentially benefit 
future patients. In giving their consent, it is important that potential 
research subjects understand the altruistic nature of their involvement. 
Obviously, this must also be understood by those who give consent in 
the form of an ARD. In this regard, it has been argued that, in such a 
context, the individual must, at least, be able to understand the distinction 
between being a ‘patient’ and a ‘research subject’ (Backlar 1998; Alzheimer 
Europe 2011). 
Rebecca Dresser (2001) has pointed out how demanding it is to ask 
people at risk of dementia to imagine how it would be to participate in 
research after the onset of cognitive impairment. She even notes that ‘it 
may be a rare person who can genuinely achieve this level of understanding’. 
In addition, although therapeutic misconception is not the prerogative of 
only dementia patients, Dresser reports empirical results demonstrating 
how frequently potential dementia research participants misunderstand 
the proposed study, notably the fact that it is not another treatment option, 
but principally aims to produce generalizable knowledge (Dresser 2001). 
This ‘therapeutic misconception’ can be even greater if the same advance 
directives combine treatment and research purposes (Pierce 2010). This 
kind of misunderstanding is more likely to happen if the research subjects 
are already mildly affected by dementia. The assessment of the decision-
making capacity of such individuals poses a significant ethical and legal 
challenge (Trachsel et al. 2015), and should be exercised with caution, in 
order to prevent any misuse or deception of potential research subjects. 
It is generally accepted that participants in medical research ‘must be 
adequately informed of the aims, methods, sources of funding, any 
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possible conflicts of interest, institutional affiliations of the researcher, 
the anticipated benefits and potential risks of the study and the dis-
comfort it may entail, post-study provisions and any other relevant 
aspects of the study (…)’ (WMA 2013). There are in principle no reasons 
for departing from these requirements in the case of prospective consent 
to dementia research. This is certainly the case for on-going clinical trials, 
providing that there are no changes in the protocol. However, it should 
be noted that it may be more difficult when dealing with future clinical 
trials, the design of which are not finalized. In any case, it is crucial that 
ARDs are very specific about the procedures to which participants will 
be exposed (for instance, taking blood samples, monitoring blood pres-
sure, testing new drugs, etc.), as well as about the risks and burdens 
associated with these procedures. 
Even though ARDs are defendable as an initial authorisation for research 
participation, and are a valuable means to promote patients’ autonomous 
decisions, other safeguards remain necessary to ensure the well-being of 
cognitively impaired participants. It has been pointed out that, in practice, 
at any sign of distress, dissent or discomfort, incompetent participants 
are excluded from clinical trials (Jongsma & van de Vathorst 2015b). 
Nevertheless, the protection of incapacitated subjects cannot merely 
depend on the good will of researchers but should be ensured by legal 
mechanisms. It is important to guarantee that the well-being of partici-
pants is constantly monitored from both the researchers’ side and also 
from the participant’s side (i.e. the proxy). Physicians, researchers and 
ethics committees, due to the regular assessment of any changes in the 
protocol and in the balance benefit/risk, have to make sure that the parti-
cipation of incapacitated subjects is in conformity with the prior consent 
and with the legal requirements. Such consent should therefore not be 
understood as a simple authorisation at the start of the study, but as a 
continuous process throughout the trial. This is why the involvement of a 
legal representative is crucial in terms of monitoring and accountability. 
The proxy, who is someone close to the participant and has no personal 
interest in the research, is in a good position to assess the burdens that 
may result from research participation, and interpret whether the subject 
is willing to continue participation in the trial.
Concerning the possibility of withdrawal from research trials by partici-
pants after the onset of their incapacity, it has been argued that ARDs 
can be revoked at any time, even when the individual has already lost 
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his or her decision-making capacity (Backlar 1998). This means that ‘the 
threshold for the capacity to revoke or refuse to participate should be 
lower than the capacity to consent’ (Moorehouse & Weisstub 1996). 
Similarly, Alzheimer Europe (2009) lists among the conditions for the 
implementation of ARDs that the person ‘does not show any sign of 
unwillingness to participate at the start of the research, eg. refusing to 
take medication when offered, obvious distress when interviewed, etc.,’ 
and that the participant does not display signs of unwillingness to continue 
participating and/or experience distress as a result of the research.’ These 
conditions are in conformity with the European Biomedicine Convention, 
which requires that the incompetent individual ‘does not object’. Similarly, 
the 2014 EU Regulation on Clinical Trials expressly gives incapacitated 
persons the right to withdraw from trials, independently from the opinion 
of their legal representatives (article 31). However, this right to withdraw 
is rather demanding in the Regulation, as the patient has to express an 
‘explicit wish’ and must be ‘capable of forming an opinion and assessing 
the information’ (article 31.1.c). 
The right to withdraw from research can be compared to the way in which 
advance treatment refusals operate. Incapacitated patients who ask for 
life-saving treatments, which they have refused in an advance directive, 
would probably be treated, even if they have already lost their decision-
making capacity (Lemmens 2012). This is because priority is given to the 
least harmful alternative, which is non-refusal of life-saving treatments, 
and in the case of ARDs, non-participation in research, even when the 
risks and burdens are very low. In other words, the initial consent given 
by means of ARDs is not sufficient to continue research procedures when 
participants show clear signs of unwillingness to continue participating 
in the trial.
The Role of Proxies
Legal instruments in Europe state explicitly that the consent of the legally 
authorised representatives or proxies is absolutely required to enrol 
incapacitated adults in research trials (Biomedicine Convention 1997; 
European Regulation 2014). However, from a theoretical perspective one 
may wonder whether such consent is necessary when the patient had 
consented in advance to research participation at a time when he or she 
was still competent. In this regard, Pierce (2010) suggests that ARDs 
can operate without the involvement of a proxy. She argues that there 
are individuals who do not wish to defer the decisions concerning their 
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participation in research to a surrogate decision-maker (Pierce 2010). 
Therefore, she claims that, for reasons of equality, ARDs should be available 
to all competent individuals who wish to prospectively consent to research, 
regardless of whether they appoint a proxy. 
This proposal is problematic, at least for practical reasons. It is difficult 
to imagine how a cognitively impaired individual could participate in 
clinical trials without the assistance of a trusted, independent caretaker. 
It must be noted that the proxy does not necessarily have to be a family 
member but could be any trusted person, including the treating physician, 
insofar he or she does not have any direct interest in the clinical trial. 
Proxies are in a better position than researchers to detect any discomfort 
or adverse reaction that the demented person may experience as result 
of his or her participation in the trial. Furthermore, proxies can be consul-
ted by researchers about the interpretation of the directives and about 
any possible change in the original protocol that may imply additional 
risks or burdens for participants.
A related question is whether the proxy should be allowed to override the 
advance consent of the participant. As Pierce (2010) has pointed out, 
there could be situations in which this would be acceptable, for instance, 
a change in protocol that results in an alteration in the research experience, 
a change in patient behaviour with assessment by an independent 
behavioural psychologist, or a change in risk exposure, either as a result 
of a change in protocol or in the participant’s health condition. Certainly, 
those changes have to be relevant enough to justify overriding the consent 
of the participant. This can be the case, for instance, if the changes in the 
protocol or in the health condition of participants create unanticipated 
burdens and risks for them, or if the subjects show clear signs of distress, 
fear or pain as a result of their participation in the trial. These situations 
show how important the involvement of an independent, trusted person 
to ensure the well-being of the incapacitated subject.
Level of Acceptable Risks and Burdens
It has been pointed out that ‘perhaps one of the most complex issues in 
the use of ARDs is whether it should be acceptable to prospectively con-
sent to the full spectrum of risk, including risky research’ (Pierce 2010). 
Some scholars claim that it is permissible to consent to more than min-
imal risk and minimal burden on the grounds that the advance directive 
reflects the autonomous decision of the individual at a time when he or 
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she was still competent (Buller 2014; Pierce 2010). But it can also be 
legitimately argued that ARDs are subject to the general limit of minimal 
risk and minimal burden that applies to all research studies involving 
incapacitated subjects. The reason for this is that the participant is 
especially vulnerable when the research is conducted and therefore 
deserves special protection at the time of the trial, making it irrelevant 
whether he or she was competent when the advance directive was made.
The current European legal framework on biomedical research clearly 
follows this second position: incapacitated subjects can be enrolled in 
research that does not offer the prospect of direct benefit only when it 
poses minimal risk and minimal burden (Biomedicine Convention: article 
15; European Regulation: article 31). There is no exception to this rule 
based on the circumstance that the individual had previously made an 
advance directive and accepted levels of risk and burden higher than 
minimal. In the European regulations, the ‘minimal risk and minimal burden’ 
limit seems to have the status of an ordre public rule, which means that it 
cannot be the subject of renunciation. In this respect, it must be mentioned 
that the Biomedicine Convention prescribes that some of the protective 
provisions it contains cannot be set aside by the states’ domestic laws 
(article 26). Interestingly, Article 17, which sets the ‘minimal risk and minimal 
burden’ limit, is explicitly mentioned as one of those non-negotiable 
provisions.
In the past, several American experts have favoured the first position 
mentioned above. They have argued that an advance consent would be 
an acceptable basis for allowing the incompetent individual to be involved 
in research with higher risk than the one permitted for other incompetent 
subjects (ACP 1989). More recently, Buller (2014) claims that advance 
directives for research and for treatment are similar and therefore, the 
level of acceptable risks should be similar as well. Based on the comparison 
with advance refusals of life-sustaining treatments, he argues that a person 
has the right to expose herself to high risks, including the risk of death. 
Therefore a person should equally be able to decide in advance to expose 
oneself to risky research, and not be limited to research involving minimal 
risk. 
However, leaving aside the current legal obstacles to the use of ARDs for 
research involving risks higher than minimal, there are reasons to remain 
sceptical about this possibility. The analogy with advance directives for 
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health care is not satisfactory. There is a crucial difference between 
prospectively consenting to treatment and to participation in research. 
Preferences regarding health care, including the refusal of treatments 
that the patient considers to be too burdensome or useless, are directly 
related to the well-being of that same patient who made the advance 
directive. On the contrary, research studies are normally not designed 
to benefit participants themselves, but to gain scientific knowledge that 
may eventually help future patients. The altruistic nature of research 
participation explains why research involving human beings is subject to 
conditions that do not apply to treatment, not even to treatment refusals. 
These additional safeguards concerning research need to be taken particu-
larly seriously when participants are cognitively impaired at the time the 
research is carried out. 
Moreover, empirical evidence provides us reasons to believe that most 
individuals consenting to research participation by means of advance 
directives would prefer not to be exposed to risks higher than minimal. 
In this regard, it is interesting to note an empirical study in which patients 
were asked to complete a research advance directive and to express 
their preferences regarding participation in clinical trials (Muthappan et 
al. 2005). Only 11 per cent of patients accepted to complete a research 
advance directive. The great majority of them (76 per cent) were not 
willing to be exposed to more than minimal risk, while 49 per cent were 
also willing to take part in research without direct benefit, but which only 
posed minimal risk. Only 9 per cent of those who were in favour of making 
an ARD (that is, 1 per cent of the total of patients who were initially invited 
to complete an ARD) would accept to participate in research that would 
not help them and posed greater than minimal risk.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has sought to draw attention to the fact that the European 
legal framework for biomedical research, as well as most European 
domestic laws, are virtually silent about the use of advance directives 
for research purposes. At the same time, it has shown that these same 
norms do not explicitly exclude the possibility of prospective consent to 
research participation. Considering that ARDs are perfectly in line with the 
commitment of European institutions to support patients’ self-determination, 
we think that these tools could be integrated into the existing European 
norms relating to biomedical research. However, essential questions remain 
to be explored in greater depth. These include questions around how 
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detailed the trial information which is given to potential participants must 
be, the role of the proxy before and during the trial, and the level of accep-
table risk and burden which should be permitted in the context of ARDs.
As mentioned above, the use of ARDs can be justified in moral terms on 
the grounds that they contribute to patients’ self-determination. Besides, 
ARDs could help to increase the amount of clinical trials with dementia 
patients and facilitate the development of specific drugs for this population. 
On the one hand, ARDs could do more justice to the patient’s prior wishes 
than proxy consent does. On the other hand, it is unlikely that ARDs 
without the appointment of a proxy can offer a stand-alone solution to 
the requirement of informed consent. The involvement of a proxy seems 
indispensable to implement the advance directives in the light of the 
complete information at the time the research is conducted. In addition, 
other safeguards are necessary to ensure the well-being of incompetent 
participants, for example the right to withdraw or to be withdrawn from 
the trial at any time. Another question concerns the level of risks that can 
be accepted by means of ARDs. From the legal point of view, current 
regulations clearly forbid exposing incompetent participants to more 
than minimal risk and minimal burden, regardless of whether they have 
consented to them in advance or not. But from an ethical point of view, 
the question remains open for discussion.
In conclusion, it is desirable to clarify the legal status of ARDs and the 
conditions for their use in Europe. This would not only help to satisfy the 
wish of potential participants in dementia research, but also benefit future 
dementia patients by developing more effective therapeutic or preventive 
measures. This clarification would also facilitate the task of researchers 
and ethics committees. In this regard, it would be appropriate for the 
Council of Europe, for instance, to address the use of ARDs, at least in 
their Guide for Research Ethics Committees (2012). Similarly, the European 
Commission could include guidance on ARDs while revising and updating 
the current guidelines and recommendations on clinical trials in the light 
of the new Clinical Trials Regulation. In the context of an increasingly 
ageing population, the incidence of dementia is expected to grow in the 
coming years. Therefore, the need for research with incapacitated elderly 
patients will become more and more pressing. In this scenario, ARDs 
could turn out to be a useful tool to both empower potential research 
participants and contribute to the development of more effective treat-
ments for dementia.
Karin Jongsma
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ABSTRACT
In order to discover an effective treatment for dementia it is necessary to 
include dementia patients in clinical research trials. Dementia patients face 
an increased risk to lose the capacity to consent to research participation, 
and research possibilities with incompetent participants are legally 
strictly limited. One solution is for patients to consent to research with 
an advance research directive (ARD) whilst still competent. In order to 
explore whether such a directive would be useful and valuable in practice 
we conducted a qualitative study (13 interviews). We explored the opinions 
and arguments of researchers in the field of dementia, aiming to map 
the possibilities and constraints of ARDs. It was argued that a positive 
ARD could be valuable to discuss research participation with proxies, 
and patients with a negative ARD will be excluded from research trials. 
Furthermore, it is argued that an ARD cannot replace the informed 
consent procedure, and in practice proxy dissent will overrule written 
consent. The practical use of ARDs is thus limited, as most researchers 
will not comply with positive directives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the increase of the ageing population, it is expected that the number 
of patients with dementia will also increase in the future (Alzheimer 
Europe 2009; Corrada et al. 2010). In order to discover an effective 
treatment for dementia it is necessary to include dementia patients in 
clinical research trials. However, while it is of great importance that these 
patients are involved in research, it is also important that their participation 
is based upon appropriate consent regimes. In medical ethics, informed 
consent is often described as the way to respect the patient’s autonomy 
and to prevent abuse (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; Manson and O’Neill, 
2007). Informed consent is valid if the participant is competent to make 
this decision autonomously. Patients with dementia face an increased risk 
of losing the capacities to consent to research participation (Berghmans 
1998; Rosenstein & Miller 2008), and research with incapacitated adults 
is restricted by most legal guidelines  (Biomedicine Convention 1997; 
ICH GCP 1996; WMA Declaration of Helsinki 2008). 
The group of patients with dementia was, at an earlier stage of their life, 
able to give their consent to participation in research. Therefore we won-
dered whether it would be an option to obtain their consent in the phase 
when they are still competent. If potential research subjects draw up an 
advance research directive (ARD) this would allow dementia patients to 
control decisions about research participation after they have lost the 
capacities to provide informed consent. In an ARD they could describe 
the circumstances under which they would be willing to participate in 
research, and to which research goals they would be willing to contribute. 
The importance of previously expressed wishes is recognized in two 
European guidelines. According to the additional protocol of the Bio-
medicine Convention (1997), previously expressed wishes or objections 
have to be respected, and the European Union Clinical Trials Directive 
2001/20/EC (2001) states that the specific protective rules for clinical 
trials with incompetent adults do not apply if consent is given in advance. 
ARDs have been discussed as a possible solution (Berghmans 1998; 
Dewing 2008; Muthappan et al. 2005; Pierce 2010). However, it is not 
only important to investigate ARDs from a legal and ethical perspective, 
but it is necessary to understand how ARDs contribute to the practical 
problems of doing research with incompetent elderly. 
Only limited empirical studies on the actual use of advance directives in 
the context of research are available. Most available data focus on the 
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use of advance directives in the care setting, as advance directives were 
introduced historically to influence future care decisions (Bond and Lowton 
2011; De Boer et al. 2012; Steward et al. 2011; Van Oorschot and Simon, 
2006). Even though both physicians and proxies usually have positive 
attitudes towards advance care directives, they are seldom complied with 
and appear to only marginally influence the decision-making process 
(Bond & Lowton, 2011; De Boer et al. 2012). The patient’s perspective is 
eventually not the most important factor in medical decision-making in 
the case of incompetent patients, but the medical judgment of the physician 
and the opinion of the proxies are decisive. Some empirical studies have 
shown that elderly people are willing to allow leeway to their proxies, as 
a way of deliberated authorization, to overrule their earlier choices once 
they are incompetent (Karlawish et al. 2002, 2008; Stocking et al. 2006; 
Wendler et al. 2002). The research context, however, differs from care 
settings. Some studies have described the positive attitudes of elderly 
people towards including incapacitated elderly in research trials (Karlawish 
et al. 2002, 2009; Seymour et al. 2004; Wendler et al. 2002). Consent 
procedures with dementia patients in daily research practice and the 
expected practical problems of ARDs deserve to be explored. Until we 
better understand how researchers look upon the use of ARDs, we cannot 
be sure that these directives can compensate for the lack of subject 
consent. 
In the present work, we investigated how researchers doing clinical 
research into dementia look upon the introduction of ARDs, what arguments 
they use to support their attitudes and in particular whether they are 
willing to comply with such directives. The attitudes and opinions of the 
researchers are of interest in themselves. However, we are particularly 
interested in the reasons for their opinions, to identify which ethical 
arguments are important to them and how these are interpreted. In sum-
mary, we focus on the ethical aspects of researchers’ judgments and 
the practical implications of the introduction of advance directives in 
dementia research. 
METHODOLOGY 
Participants 
Thirteen researchers known for doing research with dementia patients 
were interviewed. The participants were neurologists, gerontologists, 
nursing home physicians, psychiatrists and a psychologist. The first inter-
view was a small group interview of 2 hours’ duration with three partici-
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pants, in order to explore the main themes in the debate and to investigate 
how much of the arguments and opinions were shared. The group inter-
view was facilitated by one of the authors (SV) with the other (KJ) present 
for note-taking and input; particular care was taken to include every 
participant in the discussion. All ten other interviews were conducted 
individually (KJ). All interviews were conducted in Dutch and the topic 
of the study was briefly introduced before the start of the interview. The 
interviewees were asked to share their experiences in the field of dementia 
research and to give their opinion freely. Under Dutch law, ethical review 
is not required for this type of research. 
The main topics of the interviews were the current research practice, 
focusing specifically on the informed consent requirement and proxy 
decision-making, and on the interviewee’s attitude toward the introduction 
of advance directives in the research context. The interviews were semi-
structured, to maintain the focus on the narrations while allowing space 
for topics relevant to the various research questions (Wengraf 2001). 
All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim. During the 
interview, field notes were made and were reflected on with the recorded 
interview immediately afterwards. Major ideas, concepts, or issues raised 
by participants were documented. 
Analysis 
A list of ethical themes and practical implications of ARDs raised in the 
first group interview was discussed between the authors before conducting 
the other interviews. The interview process was iterative; any new themes 
that emerged in an interview were incorporated into the schedule for the 
subsequent interview(s). The interviews were carried out until consistent 
themes started to emerge and saturation was achieved; the interviews 
were stopped when no new themes emerged and there was repetition of 
previously identified themes. A thematic analysis was undertaken using 
a contestant comparative method: data were systematically reviewed for 
supportive/conflicting evidence for emergent themes and coded, and 
themes and subthemes were generated from the data set. A sample of 
three interviews was discussed between the authors to ensure agreement 
about the codes. Quotations have been translated from Dutch by KJ. 
RESULTS 
In this section we describe our empirical data. First we will focus on the 
current research practice and discuss the importance of informed consent, 
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and the use and difficulties of proxy consent, which gives us insight into 
dementia patients as a research population and problems in research 
practice, after which we will describe the attitudes and opinions of 
researchers towards ARDs in this group. 
Process of informed consent 
The interviewed researchers agreed that informed consent is valuable and 
important, not merely as a moral and legal requirement for research, but 
also for its practical benefits − a well-considered decision to participate 
in research results in better compliance in treatment studies and with less 
drop-out, they argued. Informed consent is, however, already problematic 
in the early phases of dementia. Patients tend to turn their heads to their 
carers when asked to make decisions; one interviewee called this the ‘head-
turning-syndrome’. Dementia patients typically lean on their carers for 
taking decisions, including in the research setting: 
‘[...] due to his disease, the patient will not take the lead and will not take 
a strong position. He leans just really on the partner. He will at first look 
at the partner and if the partner says no, the patient will follow him.’ 
Even though all underlined the importance of informed consent, hardly 
any researcher tests whether the participant still understands his partici-
pation in research after the onset of the study. Some mentioned they 
explain the specific procedure or measurement, but the researchers do 
not verify whether the patient still understands the scope of the research 
and is still willing to contribute to the research goal. Most interviewees 
assumed that patients who no longer agree to the research goals, or who 
simply do not want to participate anymore, drop out of the study or object 
to measurements: 
‘We ask assent for the specific procedure, but not for the whole goal of 
the research anymore. [...] mostly, people do not show up anymore, or 
appointments are cancelled. The dropout is substantial.’ 
Necessity and difficulties of proxy consent 
It was argued that carers have several roles in the research process. Usually 
double consent is asked (both informed consent and additional consent 
of a carer), to ensure continuous consent during research if the patient 
becomes incompetent. The assistance and consent of carers is also neces-
sary for practical reasons such as planning and logistics to the hospital, 
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since these patients are unable to find their own way or to keep their 
own appointments. It was mentioned that carers also have an important 
role in motivating participants, who owing to the nature of their disease 
often lack self-motivation. 
Most interviewees argued that proxy consent is more complicated than 
informed consent. Several reasons were given. Proxy consent involves not 
only the physician and the patient, but also the proxy as a third person. 
While some researchers considered incompetent patients able to assent 
to research participation, others questioned the researchers’ integrity 
in consent procedures with incompetent participants. It was mentioned 
that the patient’s decisions are easily influenced by both carers and 
researchers; raising questions of integrity. 
‘The autonomy of the patients decreases rapidly. Making it hard for the 
researcher to do keep integrity, because he also wants to include patients 
in his trial.’ 
Also, concerns about the patients’ best interests were raised in the context 
of delegated consent. It was argued to be doubtful whether proxies 
always take care of the patients’ interests, because some allow for too 
much and others for too little research with the patient: 
‘You suppose the proxy does what is best for the patient.’ 
Most interviewees agreed that it is important to make decisions that could 
possibly benefit the patient, but that these were also in the spirit of what 
the patient would have wanted: 
‘Well, I believe that not everyone takes it into careful consideration. What 
you hope for is a well-considered weighing whether it benefits or harms 
the patient.’ 
Advance directives 
Several critical remarks were made about the value of ARDs. Some of 
these remarks are also applicable to the use of advance directives in the 
care setting. Most mentioned that an advance directive is only practically 
useful if the researcher can understand and interpret the conditions 
described. Another general remark about advance directives was that 
preferences are unstable and the preferences of incompetent dementia 
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patients could have changed over time. The researchers argued that it is 
uncertain whether the advance directive still represents what the patient 
wants, once he is incompetent. Some argued that a written directive is 
nothing but a snapshot of preferences of when the participant was 
competent, but is not necessarily what the patient still holds valuable: 
‘During the disease process the brain and the patient change, they are 
not the same anymore. For me it is unsure whether the patient still has 
the same preferences.’ 
The value of advance research directives 
Most argued that ARDs are useful, because they capture the intentions 
of competent patients and can help proxies in their decision-making: ‘It 
[ARDs] could help us if we want to conduct studies with incompetent 
participants. It is a relevant source of information. But preferably there 
is a person who can weight the participants’ interests.’ Most agreed that 
a negative directive (not willing to participate in any research) would 
be easy to follow and would be respected by researchers. A positive 
advance directive (willingness to participate) could help the physician to 
bring up the topic of research participation to proxies. There are, however, 
practical constraints for respecting positive directives. Some argued that 
a generic con- sent would not allow for much research in practice, because 
consent requires the patient to weight his interests against a specific trial, 
and consent is only valid and valuable when the patient is well informed 
at the onset of the study. Most of the interviewees agreed that consent 
is too complex to be given in advance: 
‘It [informed consent] is a dynamic process. It is impossible to write it 
down on paper.’ 
An advance directive is considered useful in the dialogue with proxies, 
but most agreed that a written directive cannot replace informed consent: 
‘It is an indication, it helps. It helps the person who has to make the decisions 
and that could be interesting. But the status [of an ARD] is debatable.’ 
Objection and preferences 
The complexity of delegated decision-making goes beyond consent 
procedures, and becomes problematic when patients included in a 
research trial object to procedures necessary for the research. All but 
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one agreed that a patient who objects should be dismissed from the 
research trial, regardless of whether the objection is caused by a lack of 
understanding or because of the experience of discomfort: 
‘If someone has written in a directive − when I become demented I am 
willing to participate in research − and the person objects to the research 
procedures, we will always stop. I do not see the surplus value [of an ARD].’ 
The majority agreed upon the necessity to be watchful for objections of 
the patient and be careful to monitor the amount of discomfort once the 
incompetent patient is included in research: 
‘Irrespective of what someone said or whether one wrote a bunch of books 
about it 20 years ago, you cannot say: You chose this. For research it is 
not possible. For example an epidural, if you see the needle coming and 
you think, no I do not want this, you must be able to object.’ 
Suffering or objection was argued to overrule the advance directive. The 
possibility of changing preferences makes advance directives different 
from wills. Dementia patients still have preferences and show objections, 
because they can experience pain and discomfort, while dead people 
obviously cannot. 
Willingness to follow advance research directives 
Most interviewed researchers agreed that advance directives are a rele-
vant source of information, but are not a substitute for informed consent. 
None of them was willing to follow a positive ARD without additional 
consent: 
‘If one says when he is competent: If I get this disease and become 
incompetent, I find it important to contribute and you may put me in a 
trial. I find it preferable that a proxy gets saying to weight it in terms of 
risks and burden. I mean, you cannot just do anything if someone has 
consented, someone still has to weight it here and now.’ 
Proxy consent is considered absolutely necessary; proxies need to be 
informed about the actual research in the actual situation to take care 
of the patients’ interests: ‘I do not think many researchers will overrule 
the family, because of a piece of paper you have. It is thus much more 
complicated.’ 
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DISCUSSION 
This current study adds to the literature in several ways. First, we have 
focused on the use of advance directives in the research context, in which 
pitfalls and difficulties differ from those in the care setting. This study 
builds on other findings (Karlawish et al. 2007, 2009; Wendler et al. 2002) 
that found that elderly people are willing to allow leeway to their proxies 
to overrule their decisions. Finally, this study adds to literature by describing 
the use of ARDs according to researchers and describes the practical 
value such directives might have. There are limitations to this study: this 
is a qualitative study with Dutch researchers, and researchers from 
different geographical locations or with different policies may provide 
different viewpoints. Also, in order to have a broader view of arguments 
and opinions about the use of advance research directives, both proxies 
and patient opinions about the use of ARDs should be researched. 
To sum up, we have found that clinical researchers doing research in 
dementia value the informed consent prerequisite, proxy consent is highly 
valued and ARDs cannot substitute for informed consent. Some concerns 
regarding advance directives also are valid concerns regarding the use of 
advance directives in other areas. Because of the difficulties interpreting 
these directives and uncertainties whether the written preferences are 
still applicable to the incompetent patient, who often noticeably changes 
due to the disease, researchers do not value ARDs very highly. The main 
concern of researchers with ARDs is that dementia patients change their 
mind about participation after they become incompetent. The epistemo-
logical difficulty that we cannot know what an incompetent person with 
dementia truly wants, is a topic that is also recognized in the philosophical 
debate. It is a concern that is also relevant to the current research practice. 
Consent for research is not repeated or tested after the commencement 
of the study (Butterworth 2005; Dewing 2008; Warner & Nomani 2008), 
while participants suffering from dementia could also change their mind 
and face an increased risk of becoming incompetent after inclusion in 
the study. 
Proxies play a role in taking care of the patients’ interests when patients 
become incompetent and their opinion is highly valued by the clinical 
researchers. Proxy consent is, according to the clinical researchers, com-
plicated, because it is a delegated consent and it is doubtful whether 
proxies can take the best decision for an incompetent patient. However, 
proxy objections overrule a positive advance research directive in practice, 
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meaning that research cannot be done without proxy consent. The third-
person perspective of proxy consent is conceptually different from a first-
person perspective of informed consent. We find it therefore question-able 
whether proxy consent is also morally the best solution to consent issues 
with incompetent elderly, but the interviewees seemed to accept proxy 
consent as a pragmatic solution. 
The concerns mentioned about researchers’ integrity, the influence of 
carers on participation decisions and the patients’ dependence on both 
carers and researchers reflect the vulnerability of this population. Several 
researchers stressed the need to be watchful to patient objection, but we 
find it questionable whether objecting should be the only vote patients 
have in the research process. We argue there is also a need for careful 
procedures to ensure valid consent. Informed consent aims both at the 
self-rule of participants and at protecting participants from abuse. An 
advance directive is an instrument that allows for self-rule after losing 
competence, and captures precedent autonomy (Berghmans 1998); 
however it does not protect research participants against harm and does not 
make up for their vulnerability. The interviewees stressed the vulnerabil-
ity of this population, and seem to be more concerned about protection 
and objections against research than with concepts such as authorization 
and autonomous choice. This focus on protection is sometimes referred 
to as ‘gate-keeping’ (Atkinson 2007). The clinical researchers did not 
value the advance directive as a compensation for the lack of a patient’s 
autonomous consent. Negative advance directives will be respected, but 
a positive directive is considered valuable merely as a discussion paper 
of intentions, while the authorization power stays with the proxies. The 
control that such directives offer patients is thus limited. 
We recognize the concerns about the vulnerability of this population, but 
from a moral point of view we argue there should be more attention for 
the (precedent) autonomy of these patients. We feel it is a lost opportunity 
that these patients have only little to say in future research decisions. 
Many other decisions can be made for the future self, and we think that, 
especially for research-decisions, autonomous decision-making is an 
important cornerstone. 
CONCLUSION
This study shows that researchers in the field of dementia understand 
advance directives to be a source of information to make research par-
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ticipation a topic of discussion with proxies. Furthermore, researchers 
would respect negative ARDs. Positive ARDs are not seen as a substitute 
for informed consent, but are recognized to have practical value to provide 
ground for taking decisions according to what the patient would have 
wanted. ARDs are argued to capture the intentions and attitudes of the 
patient towards research at the moment the patient was still competent. 
Most researchers agreed that consent should always be tested at the 
actual moment of inclusion in research − at the moment the research 
procedure starts. If either the patient or the proxy does not agree (any 
more) with the advance directive, the patient should not be included in 
research. Proxy consent is valued more highly than an advance directive, 
because it can be given for specific research in the knowledge of specific 
information. Advance directives are, according to the clinical researchers, 
not stand-alone solutions to the consent problems with incompetent 
demented elderly. 
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Tom Buller presents a rich and thoughtful proposal for using advance 
directives in the context of research (Buller 2014). He argues that the 
arguments presented in support of advance directives within the context 
of treatment also count within the context of research. Furthermore, he 
argues that research participation can be a critical interest and, therefore, 
continues to exist during the process of dementia, and furthermore, that 
a critical interest should overrule experiential interests, eg, the experience 
of burden, during the research trial. We appreciate his contribution to 
the debate on advance directives and agree with his general claim that 
advance directives in the context of dementia research are valuable. 
However, we disagree with the statement that research and treatment do 
not differ significantly. Moreover, we argue that labelling research partici-
pation a ‘critical interest’ is too strong a claim for most people. We will 
provide more convincing arguments for the use of advance research 
directives and suggest how the value of advance research directives 
should be understood in practice. 
Buller is right in arguing that it is a pity advance directives are not used 
more frequently within the context of research. Research with people who 
suffer from dementia is important and we should search for morally 
acceptable means to increase the research opportunities in this group. 
Biomedical research, however, differs not just gradually, but fundamentally 
from research, due to its aims: the aim of treatment is to benefit the 
patients, whereas the main aim of research is not primarily to benefit the 
research participants, but to generate knowledge. Buller does not acknow-
ledge this significant difference between treatment and research, stating: 
CHAPTER 6
ADVANCE 
DIRECTIVES 
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It is true that by its very nature research is inquisitive and that neither 
researcher nor participant can know for sure what the research will show 
or fully anticipate what might occur; but one can equally claim that the 
patient and the physician do not know what a future with dementia will 
be like or whether future treatments will be discovered.
We acknowledge that the epistemically opaqueness of research is a 
necessary condition for research, as research is aimed at developing new 
knowledge. However, we strongly question whether the epistemically 
opaqueness of treatment provides a justification for the opaqueness in 
the research context. We argue that precisely because of the fundamental 
uncertainty of its effects on the research participant, the research context
 needs to be bound by specific research guidelines. 
Autonomous authorisation, or informed consent, is an important corner-
stone and a legal prerequisite for research participation, because the 
research participant needs to be able to weigh burden and risks against 
her willingness to contribute to the research goals (The Nuremberg Code 
1949; The Belmont Report 1979). While for treatment in some cases the 
will of the patient may be overruled, it is never allowed to include a research 
participant in a trial without his consent. The main problem with performing 
clinical trials on populations unable to give adequate consent, such as 
patients with dementia, is that they are not (fully) capable of deciding 
whether they want to participate in research projects and what levels of 
risk and burden they find acceptable. This is problematical in the research 
context because possible therapeutic effects alone (beneficence, as Buller 
calls it in his article) are not enough reason to justify research participation. 
Authorisation is necessary, even if it is likely that a trial will benefit the 
participant; this underlines the difference between research and treatment. 
At the same time, conducting biomedical research with these populations 
is necessary to develop proper treatments for them. Given the gradually 
progressive nature of dementia, a patient with dementia has the oppor-
tunity to anticipate his future incompetence. One of the possible ways 
to anticipate this could be by consenting to research participation using 
an advance research directive. The moral power of advance directives is 
derived from the principle of respect (Vollmann 2001; Berghmans 2000; 
Cantor 1993) for the patients (precedent) autonomy and it would be a 
valuable tool to provide autonomous authorisation beyond one’s decision-
making capacity. 
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Buller describes two interesting cases in his article. He describes the 
advance directive directed at the end-of-life decision of Mary and the 
advance research directive of William. Buller argues that the end-of-life 
decision of Mary as a critical interest is comparable with William’s critical 
interest in research participation. He argues, in line with Dworkin, that 
because critical interests are based on the person’s beliefs and convic-
tions, they remain to have authority in case of contradictory experiential 
interests. His argumentation in the article is clear; however, we question 
his claim that research participation should be understood as a critical 
interest. Whereas it is imaginable that many people will have strong ideas 
about a life worth living, we find the case of Mary, who refuses to be treated 
once she is demented, reasonable and empirically plausible. However, the 
case of William having critical interests to be included in research seems 
less plausible. Having the ‘desire to help’ as a critical interest, wanting to 
participate in a trial at all costs, might be true for very few people, and 
even fewer will have such strong views regarding research participation. 
The analogy to the end-of-life decision based on Mary’s critical interest is, 
therefore, not valid in our opinion. 
There is also a pragmatic argument. In practice, a research participant who 
is unduly distressed or harmed or who expresses discomfort should be 
excluded from a trial. Research with a patient with dementia who clearly 
objects to research procedures that will not benefit him will be immediately 
stopped in practice (Jongsma and van de Vathorst 2015). This shows that 
experiential interests do count in the research practice. We argue that 
this is a desirable and ethical practice, as we should respect autonomous 
decisions and provide research participant with sufficient protection. 
Especially in the case of vulnerable populations such as patients with 
dementia, we should be extra cautious for signs of undue harm to prevent 
any abuse or misconduct. 
We, thus, argue against the assumption that research participation is a 
critical interest and against having these critical interests overrule 
experiential interest of demented research participants. A more subtle and 
precise approach is necessary to guide the use and moral status of advance 
research directives. Considering the status such documents have in practice 
and the attitude most people have towards future research decisions, we 
propose that these documents should rather be understood as ‘a declaration 
of willingness to participate’. This document can then function as an 
authorisation to be included in a trial as advance consent. However, the 
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ethical conduct of research is not over once there is a form of authorisation. 
Researchers should also take care of their participants’ welfare during the 
trial. Protective measurements are especially necessary if the research 
population is physically and mentally vulnerable. Competent research 
participants have the right to withdraw from research at any time, and 
incompetent research participants should also have this opportunity. 
As incompetent participants are not able to change their mind about 
participation, they can only depend on others to protect their well-being 
during the trial and, therefore, should be excluded from research when 
they show signs of dissent.
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ABSTRACT
Dementia is highly prevalent and incurable. The participation of dementia 
patients in clinical research is indispensable if we want to find an effective 
treatment for dementia. However, one of the primary challenges in dementia 
research is the patients’ gradual loss of the capacity to consent. Patients 
with dementia are characterized by the fact that, at an earlier stage of 
their life, they were able to give their consent to participation in research. 
Therefore, the phase when patients are still competent to decide offers a 
valuable opportunity to authorize research, by using an Advance Research 
Directive (ARD). Yet, the use of ARDs as an authorization for research 
participation remains controversial. In this paper we discuss the role of 
autonomous decision-making and the protection of incompetent research 
subjects. We will show why ARDs are a morally defensible basis for the 
inclusion of this population in biomedical research and that the use of 
ARDs is compatible with the protection of incompetent research subjects.
CHAPTER 7
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine this typical, and unfortunately prevalent, case: Mr Jansen has 
been suffering from dementia4 for the past 4 years. At the moment there 
is no cure for dementia and he will lose more and more of his mental 
capacities. While previously in his life he was able to make his own decisions, 
he is now at the point where he has lost the capacities needed to compe-
tently make decisions. His wife will now have to make decisions for him. 
One of the decisions she is facing is whether he will participate in a 
research trial that aims to develop new treatments for the cognitive 
decline due to dementia. 
The participation in clinical research of dementia patients like Mr Jansen 
is essential for the development of more effective diagnostic instruments 
and therapeutic interventions for this condition (Downs 1997; Warner & 
Nomani 2008; Selkoe 1992). Even though the inclusion of dementia 
patients in research is necessary, it is also important that their participation 
is based on appropriate consent regimes. Patients with dementia face an 
increased risk of becoming incompetent to provide informed consent. In 
most countries, the legal possibilities for doing research with incapacitated 
research subjects are limited5 and require the consent of a legal represen-
tative (European Directive 2001; Biomedicine Convention 1997). These 
measures also have clear downsides: they restrict the possibilities of 
doing research with dementia patients, are not based upon autonomous 
authorisation of the research participant and decisions made by legal 
representatives do not necessarily conform to what the patients choose 
whilst still competent (eg. Stocking et al. 2006). Consent by a legal 
representative has therefore been criticized for failing to represent the 
patient’s wishes (Shalowitz et al. 2006). Given the often slowly progressive 
nature of dementia, and the possibility of anticipating future incompetence, 
we suggest allowing dementia patients to anticipate future research 
participation by signing an Advance Research Directive (ARD). In an 
ARD the dementia patient could describe his preferences concerning 
future research participation. 
ARDs are not yet commonly used in practice. In the United States, even 
though it is not a legal standard, the NIH allows dementia patients to 
use ARDs, but these seem to have a low rate of completion (Muthappan 
et al. 2005). In Europe, ARDs are not yet used in the context of research6, 
but for many health-care decisions, such as organ donation and end-of-
life decisions, advance directives are accepted and widely used. The use 
4   We have not specified 
due to which disease 
Mr. Jansen is suffering 
from dementia, 
because we aim to 
describe situations 
concerning cognitive 
decline, regardless of 
the underlying neuro-
degenerative disease. 
Dementia is a collective 
term, but is not a 
disease itself. When 
we write ‘a dementia 
patient’, we mean a 
person suffering from 
the symptoms of 
dementia due to an 
underlying illness, 
such as Alzheimer’s 
disease.
5   In Europe, most guide-
lines and legislation 
set additional protec-
tive rules for the in-
clusion of participants 
unable to consent, as 
consent of a legal 
representative is a 
necessary, but not 
sufficient condition. 
Additional require-
ments include a direct 
benefit to the research 
subject, or if that is not 
likely the study should 
not convey more than 
a minimal risk. These 
requirements are for-
mulated to protect the 
vulnerable research 
participant. 
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of advance directives in research remains, nevertheless, controversial, it 
is argued for example that legal representatives should make decisions 
based on the concept of ‘best-interest’ and that an anticipated decision 
is neither free nor informed (Dresser 2001; Dresser 2014; Fagerlin & 
Schneider 2004). 
In this paper we address the following questions: 1) Do ARDs provide a 
morally defensible basis for including incapacitated dementia patients in 
research trials? 2) Are ARDs a better alternative to research authorisation 
than consent by a legal representative? And 3) What are the problems 
raised by the use of ARDs in dementia research? We will argue that 
ARDs are a valuable authorisation tool, provide a morally defensible basis 
for the inclusion of dementia patients in research, and are the better 
alternative to consent by a legal representative. Furthermore we will 
show that the remaining issues all have to do with protection during the 
trial and with withdrawal. Therefore we will start by discussing the moral 
aims of informed consent as the gold standard for research authorisation, 
and then we explain the problems concerning the current practice of 
consent by a legal representative and describe why ARDs are a reasonable 
option for research authorisation. Finally, we will discuss controversies for 
using ARDs, and investigate possible solutions. 
THE MORAL AIMS OF INFORMED CONSENT 
The gold standard for acquiring a patient’s permission to be included in 
research is ‘informed consent’. The informed-consent requirement gained 
prominence in reaction to abuse of people in various experiments. The 
Nuremberg Code of research ethics, an influential response to the cruelty 
of Nazi experiments, stipulated: “The voluntary consent of the human 
subject is absolutely essential” (The Nuremberg Code 1949). The research 
participant must be adequately informed about relevant facts of the 
research trial, and must provide free and informed consent (The Nuremberg 
Code 1949; Beauchamp & Childress 2013). The moral base of informed 
consent in research lies in the ethical obligation of respect for persons. 
Respect for persons requires us to acknowledge the value of other persons 
and to treat them as ends in themselves and not merely as means to ends 
(the Belmont Report 1979). Respect for persons has two moral dimensions: 
respect for autonomy and protection of persons with diminished autonomy. 
Respect for autonomy derives from the recognition that persons are 
rational and reflective beings who can choose to live according to their 
values. Values are developed and learned over a time period, adjusted, 
6   Switzerland is a note-
worthy exception, with 
Art. 24, para. 1 of the 
domestic law stipula-
ting that “[r]esearch 
projects involving 
persons unable to 
consent which offers 
prospects of direct 
benefit to participants 
can be conducted if 
the following condi-
tions are met: 1. the 
subjects have given 
their consent when 
they were still compe-
tent and the consent 
is evidenced by a 
document.” 
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reflected upon and embodied. From these values, lasting orientations with 
a rational component are derived, which shape the preferences of the 
agent. This in contrast to wishes, which are merely an emotional desire 
at a specific point in time and may change more rapidly. Wishes are not 
necessarily in concordance with one’s values. When a wish and a preference 
are not concordant, an autonomous agent can decide whether his pref-
erences and values are primary, or whether he follows a wish. 
Decisions of autonomous persons should be respected even when these do 
not serve the well-being or the best interest of the person in an objective 
sense; it is his life, it belongs to him and no one else (Feinberg 1989). Acts 
that could harm or seem wrongful can be considered rightful as long as 
a person voluntarily consents to bear these adverse consequences. As 
John Harris said: “consent is a dimension of respect for persons in that 
it is through consenting to things that affect us that we make those things 
consistent with our own values. When we consent to what others propose 
we make their ends and objectives part of our own plans” (Harris 2003). 
As biomedical research is not primarily aimed at the wellbeing of the 
participant - its primary aim is to collect data and gain knowledge – auto-
nomous authorization is absolutely necessary. This authorization is generally 
understood as a continuous process; throughout the research trial the 
patient should be willing to continue participation, and is free to withdraw 
at any time for any reason.
The informed-consent approach respects the autonomy of participants 
competent to make decisions, but is problematic when subjects lack 
decision-making capacity. Dementia patients progressively lose higher 
cognitive functions such as memory, reasoning, comprehension, judgment 
and understanding in the more advanced stages (Bielby 2008; Logsdon 
et al. 2002; McKhann et al. 2011). Therefore, they face an increased risk 
of becoming incompetent7. When a person becomes incompetent and is 
not (fully) capable of providing free, voluntary and informed consent, the 
second meaning of respect for persons acquires prominence: protection. 
The extent of the required protection varies for the capacities that are 
lost, depends on the specific situation and should depend on the risk 
of harm and the likelihood of benefit (the Belmont Report 1979). The 
protection of incompetent research subjects is not absolute; it does not 
result in the exclusion of incompetent persons from research altogether, 
but additional requirements regarding the risk and burden of research 
apply in most jurisdictions and the consent of a legal representative is 
7   Autonomy and 
competence differ in 
meaning, autonomy 
implies self-governance 
and competence 
implies the ability to 
perform a task, but 
the criteria for the 
competent person and 
for the autonomous 
person are remarkably 
similar (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2013).
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required. The protection of incompetent research subjects should, however, 
not imply the complete exclusion of the incompetent person from the 
authorisation process, especially not when this person anticipated his 
future incompetence. 
THE PROBLEMS OF CONSENT BY A LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
In the light of the moral aims of the informed consent requirement it 
becomes apparent that the current legal standard of substituted authori-
zation by a legal representative (proxy consent) is problematic in several 
ways. In this section we will argue that 1) proxy consent does not do 
justice to the voice of the research participant, 2) making decisions as a 
legal representative is no easy task and 3) research possibilities are limited 
when autonomous authorisation by the research subject is not possible.
Firstly, the authority of proxy consent comes from the assumption that 
legal representatives know the incapacitated person well and can give 
voice to what the research participants would have decided. This is also 
reflected in the fact that some legal guidelines for proxy consent require 
the legal representative to act on the basis of the persons’ presumed 
will (eg. WMO Dutch National law; European Directive 2001). However, 
even with good intentions and with knowing each other well, epistemic 
problems persist due to the lack of transparency we have to each other, 
especially in unusual situations (Holm 2001). The underlying assumption 
that legal representatives know what the incapacitated person would 
have decided is thus questionable, and the proxies’ judgements about 
their loved ones’ preferences are often discordant (Kim et al. 2013). 
Empirical studies in which legal representatives and patients with mild 
dementia were interviewed separately about the willingness to participate 
in clinical research trials show that legal representatives are either too 
reluctant to authorize enrolment in clinical trials, or consent to studies 
that do not really correspond to the preferences and values of the persons 
they represent (eg. Stocking et al. 2006; Shalowitz et al. 2006). Decisions 
made by legal representatives do not respect the autonomy of research 
participants, because they do little justice to the preferences of incapa-
citated subjects. Therefore they are a poor means to extend the incompetent 
participant’s voice in the decision-making process. Interestingly, a majority 
of dementia patients would leave their legal representative (some) leeway 
to make decisions for them in the future that differ from their own pref-
erences, if the legal representative would get access to better or more 
information (Kim et al. 2013). However, a minority would not be comfor-
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table with legal representatives making decisions against their own 
preferences (Kim et al. 2013; Stocking et al. 2006), these persons would 
want their legal representatives to give voice to their own preferences 
and wishes. 
Secondly, legal representatives experience their task to make decisions 
for their incompetent loved ones’ as difficult, and have problems in bearing 
the burden and responsibility of making decisions for a dementia patient 
(Livingston 2010; Sugarman 2001). They experience guilt and stress and 
have problems with processing the provided information (Wendler & 
Rid 2011). To make decisions as a legal representative is especially hard 
in circumstances in which long time roles and patterns of authority are 
reversed and confidences are sometimes breached (Livingston et al. 2010). 
For example, it is conceivable that a child who has always been obedient 
to his parents, will have difficulties in taking the lead when his authoritarian 
parent becomes incompetent to make his own decisions.
Thirdly, the possibilities of doing research without the consent of the research 
participant are rather limited. Proxy consent is a less robust authorization 
than authorization by the research subject himself, and consent by a legal 
representative has only little moral authority compared to autonomous 
authorisation by the research subject. Therefore, the measure and extent 
to which a third party may expose the incompetent research subject to 
risk or harm is limited to either therapeutic research, or non-therapeutic 
research with minimal risk and minimal burden (eg. Biomedicine Convention 
1997, European Directive 2001). The possibilities of doing research with 
dementia patients, based on proxy consent, are therefore limited.
ADVANCE RESEARCH DIRECTIVES AS A REASONABLE OPTION
Given the often slowly progressive nature of dementia, and therefore the 
possibility of anticipating future incompetence, dementia patients could 
anticipate future research participation by signing an ARD. Dementia patients 
have ‘a history of autonomy’ and have lived a life in which they have expres-
sed their ideals and preferences. Now they have lost the capacities to make 
their own decisions, their own voice should still matter in the authorization 
process. Advance directives make this possible to some extent. We will 
argue that 1) autonomous decisions may be directed at the future 2) that 
respecting autonomy goes beyond respecting preferences of persons 
with here and now autonomy, 3) that ARDs capture autonomous wishes 
and 4) legal representatives may benefit from ARDs.
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Firstly, if the principle of respect for autonomy requires us to respect a 
competent patient’s decisions, then it also requires us to respect such 
decisions made in advance. A person can exercise autonomy not only by 
making decisions in the present, but also by making decisions that will 
influence what is to happen in the future (Davis 2007). The difference 
between autonomy and anticipated or so called precedent autonomy is 
that precedent autonomy involves a longer passage of time, and the mere 
passage of time makes no difference to the moral authority of an agent’s 
autonomous act (Rhoden 1990). For many other decisions we reason 
according to this principle as well; the marriage, living will, advance care 
directive and the mortgage of the dementia patient remain lawful, even 
though there has been a passing of time. We have no reason to presume 
that an autonomous decision concerning research participation should 
be treated differently in that respectbe treated differently in that respect.
Secondly, respecting autonomy also implies respecting former decisions 
that shaped and gave meaning to the life of the now incompetent person 
(Buchanan & Brock 1990), as long as the decision is not changed or 
renounced in the meantime. Dementia robs patients of the capacities to 
understand or reaffirm the prior expressed preferences. Having lost the 
capacities to reaffirm prior preferences is, however, not the same as 
having changed or renounced their prior preference. In order to find out 
whether the prior set preferences are still applicable, we should try to 
imagine what the dementia patient would prefer in the current situation, 
if he were competent to decide8 (Davis 2002). Think for example about 
a Jehovah’s witness who has explicitly stated that he does not want to 
receive a blood donation if he would need it during surgery, this request 
remains to be preference of an autonomous person, and remains autho-
rative and leading, even if the Jehovah’s witness is unconscious and would, 
from a medical perspective, need a blood transfusion in order to survive. 
If there are no strong reasons to assume otherwise, the prior stated 
preferences continue to carry significance and should be the default for 
decisionmaking. 
Thirdly, an ARD captures the preferences of an autonomous person 
directed at the future and functions as a means to exercise one’s right 
to choose a future beyond one’s decision-making capacity (Beauchamp & 
Childress 2013; Davis 2007; Vollmann 2001; Dworkin 1986; Alzheimer 
Europe 2006). In an ARD the dementia patient can, at the time that he is 
still competent, describe his preferences concerning research participation 
8   Davis (2002) notes 
that it is impossible 
to be demented and 
have full mental 
capacity at the same 
time, therefore rather 
than imagining the 
patient in her actual 
circumstances with 
full mental capacity, 
we should imagine 
the patient in circum-
stances as similar as 
possible to her actual 
circumstances, but in 
such a manner that, 
unlike her actual con-
dition, she has full 
mental capacity.
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and describe which risks and burden he is willing to bear. Thereby, consent 
with an ARD does justice to the moral aim of autonomous authorisation of 
informed consent, because it is an authorisation given by the autonomous 
research subject. If we consider the authorisation given in an ARD similar 
to authorisation of informed consent, a research subject should also be 
allowed to authorise his participation in research trials containing more 
than minimal risk and burden (Pierce 2010; Buller 2014), as long as the 
patient was also informed and free to decide at the moment the ARD was 
written. An ARD would thus allow for a broader range of research trials 
than the current legal standard, and could enable valuable research in the 
search of a treatment for dementia. Besides, making an advance directive 
is itself an exercise of autonomy. The person may benefit from knowing 
that he has done everything he could to be treated in the way he wants 
to at times of incompetence (Singer et al. 1992). 
On a more practical level, we recognise that dementia patients are very 
dependent on their legal representatives, even if only for logistical and 
practical support. Legal representatives will regardless of the existence 
of an ARD, remain to play a role when the dementia patient becomes 
incompetent. ARDs can also help the legal representative in supporting 
research decisions according to the research participant’s prior preferences. 
CONTROVERSIES OF ARDS
We have argued that there are strong reasons why ARDs provide an ethi-
cally permissible base for research authorisation; there are also some dif-
ficulties that should be considered carefully. In this section we will discuss 
some concerns and controversies to the use of ARDs for dementia patients.
A general claim against the use of advance directives, is that respect for 
autonomy should not be primary in decision making for dementia patients, 
but that the ‘best-interest’ principle should be primary (Dresser 1992; 
Robertson 1991). This objection to autonomy trumping other values, 
entails that decisions should be based on choices that are beneficial to 
the dementia patient according to the assessment of others and it is 
assumed that 1) preferences do not survive the loss of mental incapacity, 
or 2) the person is incompetent to decide about future questions, there-
fore autonomy should not be primary.
The first assumption implies that preferences formulated while competent 
no longer have meaning once the person is incompetent. An advance
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directive that captures prior preferences should therefore not be followed. 
Instead, it is argued, the patient’s current wishes should be primary 
in decision-making. It is a questionable assumption to state that the 
dementia patient’s preferences and values do not survive the cognitive 
decline, because the cognitive decline implies a loss of functions, not 
necessarily of values. The difficulty in the case of dementia patients is of 
course that they may not express the prior expressed preference anymore, 
but that is not the same as having changed or renounced prior preferences. 
When cognitive capacities decline, and reflection upon their preferences 
and values is not possible anymore, we cannot simply argue that this 
person has developed a new preference or has changed his earlier values. 
Due to dementia, capacities to remember and live according to prior 
preferences are forgotten, rather than changed consciously. Furthermore, 
which values and preferences remain is not the result of a reflective process; 
therefore we cannot assume that the current unreflected wishes of the 
incompetent dementia patients should be primary. Dementia patients 
lose the capacities to make their own decisions, but it is unwarranted 
to conclude that their life is not their own anymore, and that their own 
earlier preferences no longer matter. 
The second assumption regards the incompetence to decide about future 
decisions. In general we agree to respect decisions of competent persons 
in the research context, when they are free from coercion and based on 
sufficient information, even if these decisions might harm the person in 
question. The sufficiency of information can be questioned when during 
the time gap between signing and the use of the ARD, new information 
about the research trial or about specific procedures emerges. Authorisation 
of research participation should ideally be based on the most up-to-date 
information in order to inform the research participant adequately. The 
moral authority of an ARD based on insufficient or false information is 
weakened (Buchanan & Brock 1990; Davis 2007). However, this does not 
mean that an ARD will never be based on sufficient information. As we 
have argued before, a research participant needs to be informed adequately, 
which does not imply fully informed. Therefore, as long as the anticipated 
authorisation is based on sufficient and up-to-date information, the 
authorisation given with an ARD should be considered a competent and 
valid decision. 
Rebecca Dresser (1999) states that an anticipated decision cannot be a 
truly informed decision, because the competent person needs to anticipate 
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a situation he has never experienced; namely being incapacitated. It may 
be difficult for a healthy person to anticipate one’s own wishes when ill. 
The future-oriented preference is based on assumptions, that may either 
overestimate the suffering or underestimate the burden the illness or 
medical interventions will impose (Dresser 1986). It may be even more 
difficult to anticipate the ill and cognitively impaired persons’ experience 
of research participation (Dresser 2001, 2014). It is questioned whether 
any competent person is ever fully able to anticipate the point of view 
of his incapacitated future version (Dresser 1999; Fagerlin & Schneider 
2004). It remains however unclear why from the anticipatory character 
of the decision, it should follow that prior preferences are to be ignored 
altogether. To illustrate that we generally accept anticipatory decisions from 
competent persons, independent of whether they are foreseen accurately 
or inaccurately, consider the following example: A person might want 
to have a tattoo, but has no clue whether he will be a person who likes 
tattoos when he is 65, but he also has no clue whether he will regret it 
when he has not taken a tattoo in fear of his future judgement. Whether he 
gets a tattoo or not, as long as he is competent, is a valid and autonomous 
decision, regardless of whether he agrees with it later or not. The possibility 
of being mistaken in hindsight, with a former anticipatory decision, is no 
reason to disregard the moral authority of this decision. It is, however, 
a good reason to allow dementia patients a way out, when they indeed 
appear to have foreseen the decision wrongly.
In more general terms, the best-interest account is disanalogous in the 
research context because research is never primarily in the participants 
best-interest. It could be argued that therapeutic effects from a research 
trial are ‘a reasonable person’s’ best interest, but therapeutic effects alone 
are never a sufficient reason to include anybody in any research study. 
Furthermore, the best-interest account overlooks the point that the 
dementia patient has not always been incompetent to decide. It remains 
unclear, why any proxy would be in the best position to decide about 
research participation and how this proxy can decide about the willingness 
to participate. Even if the legal representative would succeed in giving 
voice to the preferences of the research subject, it remains doubtful that 
a proxy would be better at estimating what is in the person’s interest 
than the research participant himself. Furthermore, legal representatives 
may decide for the now incompetent person, because the representative 
is competent. Deciding for an incompetent person would, according to 
Dresser’s (1999) and Fagerlin & Schneider’s (2004) argument, involve 
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the anticipation to a state of incompetence, which is arguably an even 
more difficult task for a legal representative, since he would not only have 
to anticipate to this state of incompetence but also to the point of view 
of the person they represent. It is therefore a questionable assumption that 
it is a better option to let the legal representative decide for incompetent 
research subjects. An ARD provides a more solid moral foundation for 
decision-making than the best interest account and the current standard 
of consent by a legal representative. 
PROTECTION DURING THE TRIAL: RISK, BURDEN AND WITHDRAWAL
Regardless of how the consent is given, by a research participant himself 
or by consent of a proxy, moral and practical questions emerge when 
the research participant does not want to (continue to) participate when 
the research takes place. This problem is thus not specific for the use of 
ARDs, and appears after initial authorisation is given. This problem is related 
to the idea that informed consent should be a continuous process, rather 
than a momentary authorisation, and the willingness to participate should 
persist during the trial. 
At this point, we should make an important and necessary distinction 
between the anticipation of future risks and the anticipation of future 
burden. Arguably, the anticipation of risks is more stable than the anticipation
of burden due to the nature of these concepts. The assessment whether 
a risk is acceptable is based on abstract information and depends on 
characteristics of a procedure. In order to assess whether a person is 
willing to take a risk, it is necessary to be competent, because information 
forms the base for risk-assessment. The willingness to take a certain risk 
does not change over the course of a trial, as long as the provided infor-
mation has been accurate. By contrast, the assessment of burden has an 
experiential element, and as dementia patients remain able to have subjective 
experiences, they are still able to experience the burden (Berghmans 
2000). Therefore, even though the burden seemed acceptable when 
the ARD was signed, the burden might be experienced differently. This 
warrants for extra precautions during the trial. The research participant 
deserves to be protected against undue burden, especially when he is 
incapacitated. This objection does not question the initial authorisation 
given by an ARD, but shows that withdrawal can be problematic for this 
population. Moreover it is important to mention that withdrawal from 
research, in contrast to consent, does not need to be an autonomous 
decision, and may be done for any reason at any time. However, in order 
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to be able to withdraw from a trial, it is at least necessary to know or 
remember that you are taking part in a research trial. Research partici-
pants suffering from dementia may have forgotten this. 
 
As dementia patients are limited in their abilities to express reasons for 
withdrawal; they largely depend on others for protecting their wellbeing 
during the trial. The level of burden should be monitored continuously 
and when the participant objects more than anticipated to a research 
procedure, we have reasons to withdraw him from the procedure, because 
we cannot be sure the participant is willing to continue participation. Here 
also lies a role for legal representatives, to act as a safeguard against 
exploitation and to provide protection. 
DISCUSSION
Autonomous decision-making is an important corner stone for research 
participation and, from a moral point of view; we argue that respect for 
autonomy cannot be disregarded for demented research participants. It 
is clearly desirable for persons to be able to have some say about their 
future and extend the influence of their autonomously formed preferences. 
It is precisely in anticipating circumstances in which one does not have 
the capacities to make decisions anymore, that dementia patients may 
want their preferences to be followed, in order to give direction to their 
own lives. Even though dementia patients might want to be careful with 
their future selves, that will be more vulnerable and less able to carry 
burden, the decision of how much burden they are willing to bear and to 
what extent the current person’s interests may be compromised should 
remain up to them. Therefore, his precedent autonomy should remain 
primary, as long as there are no strong reasons to assume otherwise. The 
ARD is in such cases valid as an initial authorisation and is given by an 
autonomous agent, and would thus allow for the same range of risk and 
burden in research trials as would informed consent. Thereby ARDs would 
enable valuable research in the search of a treatment for dementia. 
The objections against the use of ARDs (Fagerlin & Schneider 2004; 
Dresser 1992, 1999, 2014; Robertson 1991) are objections against advance 
directives in general. ARDs are a special type of advance directive, because 
they authorise research participation. While for treatment in some cases 
the will of the patient may be overruled, it is never acceptable to include 
a research participant in a trial without his consent. Possible therapeutic 
effects alone are not enough reason to justify research participation. 
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Authorisation is necessary, even if it is likely that a trial will benefit the 
participant; this underlines the difference between research and treatment 
(Jongsma & van de Vathorst 2015). Furthermore the opponents of advance 
directives do not convince in disregarding the anticipated preferences 
of the dementia patients nor do they succeed in disproving the moral 
authority of ARDs. They merely show that autonomous authorisation is 
necessary, but not sufficient, and we should allow dementia patients a 
way out, when they are burdened more than anticipated. 
Respect for persons implies that we should not only respect prior auto-
nomy, but also protect the no longer autonomous patients during the trial. 
We therefore need to find an adequate balance between respecting the 
prior autonomy of dementia patients and protecting the incompetent 
research participant during the trial. Dementia patients remain conscious 
and present during the trial, as opposed to many other situations advance 
directives are used for; i.e.: post mortem directives. We should therefore 
remain cautious and look for signs of resistance or objection to undue 
burden during the research procedures. Any indication that the incapa-
citated person is suffering more than anticipated should be taken seriously 
and is a good reason to stop the research procedure, but does not imply 
the overall exclusion of this person from research altogether. The wish 
to stop may not based on the person’s values, because it is unreflected 
and temporary, and should not be understood as an act against the moral 
authority of the ARD. The temporary resistance against the research 
procedure should result in stopping the research procedure, but continuation 
in the research trial at a later period of time, based on the anticipated 
preference, would be tenable. 
Coming back to the case described in the introduction, we would like 
to argue that it is a lost opportunity that Mr Jansen has little to say in 
his current research decisions. Autonomous authorisation is required 
for doing research with human participants. The exclusion of dementia 
patients from the authorization process altogether is not self-evidently 
justifiable. From a moral point of view, we argue that there should be more 
attention to the prior autonomy of demented research participants, 
particularly as research does not primarily aim to benefit the research 
participants. An ARD offers Mr Jansen the opportunity to give direction 
to his life beyond his own competence. As autonomous persons are con-
sidered to be in the best position to give direction to their lives, antici-
pated autonomous decisions should be respected as well. As long as 
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Mr Jansen is competent to give informed consent he can, at least in Europe, 
participate in research trials containing more than minimal risks, also when 
these trials do not directly benefit him. We have argued that as long as an 
anticipated authorisation is based on sufficient and up-to-date information, 
it should be allowed to cover the same range of research trials as informed 
consent of a competent person. 
CONCLUSION
Consent to participation in research is ideally based on informed, free and 
competent authorisation, by an agent who has ‘here and now’ autonomy. 
This ideal is out of reach for incapacitated dementia patients, as they are 
no longer competent. The current legal standard for including incompetent 
research subjects in research trials requires the consent of the legal 
representative, but fails to do justice to the moral aim of respect for 
autonomy. It is remarkable that there is currently only limited attention 
to the moral aim of autonomous authorisation of dementia patients. ARDs 
offer dementia patients a way to control their life beyond their own 
competence. 
ARDs can help in authorising research participation, but we should provide 
protection to research subjects once they become incompetent. This 
protection is necessary during the trial, by remaining cautious of burdening 
incompetent research participants more than they anticipated. The 
remaining issues of using advance directives for research subjects with 
dementia do not question the ARD as an authorisation tool, but all have 
to do with withdrawal and resistance. 
We conclude that both aims of respect for persons, authorisation and 
protection, are served when ARDs are used to authorise for research 
participation. ARDs allow patients to keep control beyond their own 
incompetence and are a morally defensible basis for authorising research 
participation, but ARDs cannot solve all problems of doing research with 
incapacitated participants, therefore extra precautions remain necessary.
REFERENCES 
−    Alzheimer Europe. (2006). The use of advance directives by people 
with dementia. Available at: http://www.alzheimer-europe.org/
Publications/Alzheimer-Europe-Reports.
−    Beauchamp TL and Childress JF. (2013). Principles of biomedical 
ethics. 7th edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 116, 118-119, 132.
127
Chapter VII
−    Berghmans RLP. (2000). Advance directives and dementia. Annals 
of the New York Academy of Sciences;913:105-110.
−    Bielby P. (2008). Competence and vulnerability in biomedical research. 
Springer: the Netherlands.
−    Buchanan AE and Brock DW. (1990). Deciding for others: the ethics 
of surrogate decision making. New York: Cambridge University 
Press: 38-39;98-99. 
−    Buller T. (2014). Advance consent, critical interests and dementia 
research. Journal of Medical Ethics. Published Online First DOI:10.1136/
medethics-2014-102024.
−    Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. (1997). Convention 
for the protection of human rights and dignity of the human being 
with regard to the application of biology and medicine. Oviedo: 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. Available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/164.htm.
−    Davis JK. (2002). The concept of precedent autonomy. Bioethics;
16(3):114-133.
−    Davis JK. (2007). Precedent autonomy, advance directives, and end 
of life care. In: The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics. B. Steinbock ed. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 349-373.
−    Downs M. (1997). The emergence of the person in dementia research. 
Ageing & Society;17:597-607.
−    Dresser R. (1986). Life, death, and incompetent patients: conceptual 
infirmities and hidden values in the law. Arizona Law Review;28:373-405.
−    Dresser R. (1992). Autonomy Rrevisited: The limits of anticipatory 
choices. In: Dementia and Aging: Ethics Values and Policy Choices. 
RH Binstock, SG Post and PJ Whitehouse (eds). Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 71-85.
−    Dresser R. (1999). Planning for future research participation: ethical 
and practical considerations. Accountability in Research: Policies and 
Quality Assurance;7(2–4):129-136.
−    Dresser R. (2001). Advance directives in dementia research: promoting
autonomy and protecting subjects. IRB;23:1-6.
−    Dresser R. (2014). Law, ethics, and the patient preference predictor. 
The Journal Of Medicine And Philosophy;39:178-86.
−    Dworkin R. (1986). Autonomy and the Demented Self. The Milbank 
Quarterly;64:4-16.
Karin Jongsma
128
−    European Parliament and Council Directive 2001/20/EC. (2001) 
Approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
of the Member States relating to the implementation of good clinical 
practice in conduct of clinical trials on medical products for human 
use. Available at: http://www.eortc.be/services/doc/clinical-eu-directive-
04-april-01.pdf.
−    Fagerlin A and Schneider C. (2004). Enough: the failure of the living 
will. Hastings Centre Report;34:30-42.
−    Feinberg J. (1989). Harm to Self. New York: Oxford University Press, 59.
−    Harris J. (2003). Consent and end of life decisions. Journal of Medical 
Ethics;29:10-15.
−    Holm S. (2001). Autonomy, authenticity, or best interest: Everyday 
decision-making and persons with dementia. Medicine, Health Care 
and Philosophy;4:153-159.
−    Jongsma K and van de Vathorst S. (2015). Dementia research and 
advance consent: it is not about critical interest. Journal of Medical 
Ethics;41(8):708-709. 
−    Kim SYH, Kim HM, Ryan KA, Appelbaum PS, Knopman DS, 
Damschroder L and De Vries R. (2013). How important is “accuracy” 
of surrogate decision-making for research participation? PLoS 
ONE,8(1), e54790.
−    Livingston G, Leavey G, Manela M, Livingston D, Rait G, Sampson E, 
Bavishi S, Shahriyarmolki K and Cooper C. (2010). Making decisions 
for people with dementia who lack capacity: qualitative study of 
family carers in UK. British Medical Journal;341:c4184
−    Logsdon RG, Gibbons LE, McCurry SM and Teri L. (2002). Assessing 
quality of life in older adults with cognitive impairment. Psychosomatic 
Medicine;64:510-519.
−    McKhann GM, Knopman DS, Chertkow H, Hyman BT, Jack CR Jr, 
Kawas CH, Klunk WE, Koroshetz WJ, Manly JJ, Mayeux R, Mohs RC, 
Morris JC, Rossor MN, Scheltens P, Carrillo MC, Thies B, Weintraub S 
and Phelps CH. (2011). The diagnosis of dementia due to Alzheimer’s 
disease: Recommendations from the National Institute on Aging 
Alzheimer’s Association workgroups on diagnostic guidelines for 
Alzheimer’s disease. Alzheimer’s and Dementia;7(3):263–269.
−    Muthappan P, Forster H. and Wendler D. (2005). Research advance 
directives: protection or obstacle? The American Journal of Psychiatry;
162:2389-2391.
−    Pierce R. (2010). A changing landscape for advance directives in 
dementia research. Social Science & Medicine;70:623-630.
129
Chapter VII
−    Rhoden NK. (1990). The limits of legal objectivity. North Carolina 
Law Review;68:856-7.
−    Robertson JA. (1991). Second thoughts on living wills. Hastings 
Center Report;21:6-9.
−    Selkoe DJ. (1992). Aging brain, aging mind. Scientific American;
267:135-142.
−    Shalowitz DI, Garrett-Mayer E and Wendler D. (2006). The accuracy 
of surrogate decision makers: A systematic review. Archives of Internal 
Medicine;166:493–497.
−    Singer P, Ambrosio E, Hughes, D. et al. (1992). Advance directives: are 
they an advance? Canadian Medical Association Journal;146:127-134.
−    Stocking CB, Hougham GW, Danner DD, Patterson MB, Whitehouse PJ 
and Sachs GA. (2006). Speaking of research advance directives: 
planning for future research participation. Neurology;66:1361-1366.
−    Sugarman J, Cain C, Wallace R. and Welsh-Bohmer KA. (2001). How 
proxies make decisions about research for patients with Alzheimer’s 
disease. Journal of the American Geriatrics Society;49(8):1110–1119.
−    The Belmont Report. (1979). The Belmont report: ethical principles 
and guidelines for the protection of human subjects of research. 
Available at: http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/
belmont.html.
−    The Nuremberg Code. (1949). In: Trials of War Criminals before the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10. 
Volume 2. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 181-182.
−    Wendler D and Rid A. (2011). Systematic review: The effects on 
surrogates of making treatment decisions for others. Annals of 
Internal Medicine;154:336–46.
−    Vollmann J. (2001). Advance directives in patients with Alzheimer’s 
disease. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy;4:161-167.
−    Warner J and Nomani E. (2008). Giving consent in dementia 
research. The Lancet;372:183-185.
−    WMO (1998). Wet medisch-wetenschappelijk onderzoek met 
mensen (Medical Research Involving Human Subjects Act). Available 
at: http://www.ccmo.nl/attachments/files/wmo-engelse-vertaling-
29-7-2013-afkomstig-van-vws.pdf.
GENERAL 
DISCUSSION
—GD
131
General Discussion
Dementia is an important health concern and in the search for a treatment 
and better care, research is required. Research with dementia patients 
raises important moral, legal and practical questions, some of which are 
discussed in chapters 1 to 7. This thesis offers insight into dementia 
research and an analysis of the appropriateness of ARDs in dementia 
research. In order to further the debate on ARDs in the context of 
dementia research, I9 will discuss the main findings of this thesis, and will 
place them in a broader perspective, because our research questions are 
significant for other medical ethical questions. Also, the main conclusions 
will be presented in this chapter by answering the research questions. I 
will end with providing recommendations for policy, research and patients. 
I WHAT ARE THE MORALLY RELEVANT CHARACTERISTICS OF 
DEMENTIA RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS?
DEMENTIA RESEARCH
This first question concerns the context of dementia research and the 
characteristics of dementia patients as research participants. In chapter 
1 we offered an analysis and a reflection on Dutch dementia research 
protocols. Medical research is often argued to be important for finding 
a treatment or cure, and the results are said to be beneficial for society. 
The expected benefits of research, which can be divided in direct or so-
called therapeutic effects, and indirect or so-called societal benefits, are 
weighed against the burden and risk of the study, to decide its acceptability. 
An important premise of this model is that the results of biomedical 
research are generalisable to the population of dementia patients. This 
means that the treatment or intervention under investigation should not 
only be beneficial to research participants, but also to other dementia 
patients. If the findings from biomedical research cannot be extrapolated, 
the patient population cannot benefit from the findings of these studies. 
In chapter 1 we have shown that that the dementia research conducted 
in the Netherlands does not reflect the disease burden of the subtypes 
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9   Throughout this dis-
sertation, I have written 
in terms of ‘we’ refer-
ring to me and my co-
authors in chapter 1-7, 
To explicate where I 
refer to earlier findings, 
I will use ‘we’, and 
where I present my 
personal reflection I 
write in terms of ‘I’ in 
this final chapter. 
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of dementia. Furthermore, we have shown that the participants in dementia 
research do not reflect the patient population with regard to multimorbidity, 
living situation and severity of dementia. The conducted research has a 
low external validity, and the ambiguous criteria that are sometimes used, 
also limit the internal validity of the research. This raises crucial concerns 
about the justification and scientific value of this research. Furthermore, it 
is worrisome that there is little evidence that can be extrapolated to complex 
dementia patients who are dependent on care: the institutionalized, severely 
demented population with comorbidities. We proposed to conduct pragmatic 
studies, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of interventions in the full 
spectrum of real-life settings - as opposed to the optimal situations created 
in RCTs - in order to maximize applicability and generalisability. Pragmatic 
studies are conducted after RCTs and typically include a large number 
and a variety of participants, have patient-centred outcomes, and use 
clinical interventions similar to those used in routine care. 
The ideal that research should have implications for care fits well to the 
approach of the learning health care system. The learning health care 
system is defined by the Institute of Medicine (2007, 6) as a health care 
system ‘in which knowledge generation is so embedded into the core of 
the practice of medicine that it is a natural outgrowth and product of the 
healthcare delivery process and leads to continual improvement in care.’ 
Even though its aims seem to fit to the notion that care and research should 
co-emerge, this has so far not been discussed in the literature. The major 
question that is discussed in the context of the learning health care 
system is whether informed consent should always be required for 
randomized trials (Faden et al. 2014; Faden et al. 2013; Kim & Miller 2014). 
More in general the research-ethics paradigm with its rules and protections 
is criticised in the learning health-care system for hampering improvement 
and progression in care. In chapter 2 we have analysed the requirements 
of research regulation for vulnerable populations, and we have also 
questioned whether the research practice benefits from the large amount 
of existing research guidelines. 
A BROADER PERSPECTIVE: RESEARCH AND THE BIOMEDICAL MODEL
In the last couple of years, the strong focus on biological research into 
dementia has often been criticized (Cuijpers & van Lente 2015; The 2014; 
Richard et al. 2012; Chaufan et al. 2012; Innes & Manthorpe 2013) and it 
has been argued that the biomedical model is not the right approach to 
deal with dementia (Innes & Manthorpe 2013; The 2014). The biomedical 
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model holds that dementia is a neurodegenerative condition that should 
be diagnosed and treated, like any other physical disease. From this 
perspective, dementia is a biomedical puzzle, to be solved by medical 
interventions and biomedical innovation to stop the neuro-degeneration 
of the brain, by for example identifying biomarkers and with the use of 
neuro-imaging. While there is growing understanding of the physical 
processes associated with dementia, there is still uncertainty and lack of 
knowledge concerning the mechanisms of diseases causing dementia. Much 
research aims at early diagnosis and the development of treatments to 
stop or slow down the progress of the disease. However, up until now, this 
has not resulted in an effective treatment (Mathews et al. 2013). Researchers 
are therefore searching for new ways to improve their understanding of 
this condition and to find ways to prevent or slow down the progression 
of the disease. The same aims are set in policy strategies as the EU ‘Joint 
Planning Neurodegenerative Disease Research Strategy’ (EU Joint Program-
me 2012), the UK’s Fight on dementia (2015) and the US ‘Alzheimer’s 
Disease Neuroimaging Initiative’ (Weiner et al. 2012), as well as to a certain 
extent in the Dutch ‘Deltaplan Dementia’ (Deltaplan Dementie 2012). 
Beside the aims that are set in research and policy, also the language used 
in the search for a treatment influence our understanding of dementia. 
Military metaphors, like ‘fight’ ‘combat’ or ‘victims’ are often used in the 
biomedical discourse. Dementia is described as the enemy and is usually 
framed as a frightening or catastrophic prospect (Peel 2014). These meta-
phors are not simple linguistic devices, but structure how we understand, 
interpret and act (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). With the rhetorical understanding 
of dementia policy as a warzone, the possibility of absolute victory 
(finding a cure) becomes the ultimate goal and minimizes or excludes 
alternative ways of behaving towards these challenges (George & 
Whitehouse 2014).
The biomedical model has been criticized in the past decades for being 
too narrow and for excluding alternative approaches and solutions (The 
2014; Richard et al. 2012; Chaufan et al. 2012; Innes & Manthorpe 2013). 
Biological changes in the brain structures may be made visible in neuro-
imaging of dementia patients, but this biomedical approach fades out 
many relevant aspects of dementia that are observed by the humanities 
and social sciences. Innes and Manthorpe (2013, p689) also refer to problems 
of the reductionistic picture of the biological approach by stating the 
following:
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‘How we approach dementia (...) will impact on how we ‘see’ the problem; 
how we might try to approach it; and how we might try and respond to 
or look for a solution.’
These authors propose alternative approaches for this condition by focus-
sing more on the consequences of dementia for the individual person, on 
strategies to adjust care and support, and on the social and structural 
factors that shape the experience of dementia patients (Innes & Manthorpe 
2013). Dementia is in this approach portrayed as a condition of a person 
who may experience the disease in many different ways. Therefore, care-
ful attention to the personal situation of the patient and his family is 
warranted. The (2014) too criticized the strong focus on biomedical 
solutions that have not yet provided improvement for dementia patients. 
She proposes to aim for developing better care strategies and better 
understanding of the experience of dementia by exploring the narratives 
of people living with dementia.
I agree with these authors that the biomedical model provides a biological 
reduction of dementia and that the social dimensions of dementia deserve 
to be studied as well. The reduction of dementia to its biological aspects 
presupposes that dementia could be prevented or cured with a biological 
solution. The consequences of dementia are further reaching than solely 
biological, therefore I agree that a multidisciplinary approach to the 
disease is needed. I do not think we should give up on the biomedical 
model, as might be already obvious, since I have referred to the necessity 
and usefulness of biomedical research throughout this dissertation. 
Biomedical and social models can and should co-exist next to each other, 
in order to do more justice to the complex dimensions of dementia both 
in research and in care. In the search and hope for a treatment, the care 
for dementia patients should not be forgotten. The experience and needs 
of dementia patients also need to be studied, in order to care for them 
in the broad sense of the word (Nuffield Council 2009). This means that 
the ‘war’ on dementia entails more than the search for a future treatment. 
Our efforts to ‘fight’ should not only potentially benefit future patients, 
but we additionally should make efforts to focus on quality of care to 
benefit current dementia patients. Social research is necessary to provide 
evidence how people with dementia can be supported and how quality 
of care can be improved. The social dimension of dementia should not 
be relocated to the background, including in decisions concerning the 
attribution of research funding. This has also been recognized by others. 
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Chaufan (2012), for instance, has argued that the narrow picture of dementia 
in the biomedical model, which holds basically ‘treatment of behavioural 
disturbances’, needs to be broadened. Cuijpers & van Lente (2015) also 
argue that a biomedical diagnosis, based on biomarkers or brain images 
is not always congruent with the patient’s experience of symptoms and 
pathology, therefore a combination of both perspectives is necessary 
in order to develop treatment and diagnostic tools that provide surplus 
value for the patient and their caregivers (Cuijpers & van Lente 2015; 
Nuffield Council 2009). They are of course right in stating that providing 
good care involves communication, comforting and support, and not merely 
solving the biomedical puzzle. 
DEMENTIA RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
In chapter 2 we have discussed the morally relevant similarities and 
differences between children and dementia patients as research subjects. 
In this chapter we have shown that morally relevant particularities of the 
different groups are not always acknowledged in legal and ethical guidelines. 
Dementia patients form a vulnerable population; they have reduced 
capacities to protect themselves from harm and deserve additional 
protection against disproportionate harm in research. Furthermore, their 
(partial) incapacity to make decisions has not been a permanent condition, 
allowing dementia patients to anticipate future incompetence, for example 
by the use of an ARD. We proposed to set specific requirements for 
dementia patients in the research regulation, because they differ signi-
ficantly from other incompetent adults. Next to that observation, we 
have seen that there are a great number of legal documents and ethical 
guidelines with a variety of rules for conducting research with groups of 
incompetent participants. We have expressed the worry that the variation 
in these documents may hinder the guiding function these documents aim 
to provide. Both ethical guidance of research trials and the adequate 
protection of research subjects are not served by this diversity of require-
ments.
A BROADER PERSPECTIVE: DEMENTIA PATIENTS ARE NO CHILDREN
In chapter 2 we have provided a comparison between requirements for 
doing research with children and dementia patients, because some guide-
lines set the same requirements for both groups, while others have distinct 
rules for these groups. There is more to say about the comparison between 
children and dementia patients and in this section I will specifically discuss 
the inappropriateness of describing dementia patients as behaving ‘childish’. 
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Not only in informal language but also in scientific papers, dementia 
patients have been described as behaving childlike or being ‘infantile’. 
(eg. Biondi 2007; The Alzheimer’s Workbook). As I have argued before, 
metaphors influence how we perceive and act, and I think describing 
dementia as a sort of time machine in which you can go ‘back to child-
hood’ is erroneous. Moreover, treating dementia patients as if they are 
children, is wrong, because they are not. The difference between children 
and dementia patients is rather obvious, and treating dementia patients 
as children is disrespectful and may disempower them (Nuffield 2009). 
Dworkin (1993) has made a valuable distinction that may help to explain 
why the difference between dementia patients and children is morally 
important and why we should not treat dementia patients as children. 
Dworkin, distinguishes two abilities, the first one is the ability to have a 
‘genuine preference or character or conviction or a sense of self’, which 
can be understood as the ability to form values that are your own. The 
second ability is to act on your convictions, meaning bringing your values 
into practice. In the case of dementia patients, these two abilities come 
apart. They have developed values, but have lost the abilities to act upon 
them. On the other hand, a child is still developing himself, and tries to 
find out what his values and preferences are. In the first years of his life, 
a child does not act reflected or self-conscious at all. It is for most children 
only during puberty that they try to find out what their personal stance 
is and oppose values and preferences they have learned from their parents 
in order to develop values of their own. Whereas it has been argued that 
children should have ‘the right to an open future’ (Feinberg 1980), elderly 
have had this ‘future’ full of choices and development already. Hence, 
the ability children lack, differs from the ability dementia patients lack. 
For children the question is: ‘Who am I and what do I value’. For elderly, 
there is already a certain stability developed and the question is rather: 
‘What does (still) fit my values?’ If we understand dementia as an impair-
ment of acting upon one’s values, while one’s values are one’s own, and 
remain important, we have reasons to enable dementia patients to live 
their life with dementia according to these values. This argument, regar-
ding the importance of prior values, is the argument that will be outlined 
in detail in the next section.
To sum up, we have argued that dementia research should benefit the 
entire population of dementia patients. Furthermore, we have argued 
that dementia patients have particular characteristics that should be 
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recognized in ethical and legal guidelines. Dementia patients differ 
significantly from children: they have developed the ability to value and 
have formed wishes, which might maintain their significance for a time 
when they no longer have the ability to act upon their own values. 
II  HOW SHOULD OPPOSING FORMER AND CURRENT WISHES 
OF DEMENTIA PATIENTS BE UNDERSTOOD?
It has been often described that dementia patients change their mind so 
that their current wishes no longer align with their former preferences. 
This poses a dilemma for physicians and family-members: should the prior 
preferences or the current wishes be followed? There are two questions 
related to these situations: The first one is the metaphysical objection 
whether the healthy individual who becomes a dementia patient should 
be understood to be the same person. The second is the epistemic question 
concerning anticipation of future wishes and whether we can foresee 
our future wishes. 
In chapter 3, we have discussed a specific model, response shift theory, 
that is used by some researchers (Schötzel-Dorenbos et al. 2010; Diaz-
Ponce & Cahill 2012; Byrne-Davis et al. 2006; Booij 2014) to explain why 
dementia patients ‘adapt to their disease’. In this chapter we have shown 
how response shift theory is used in the context of dementia patients, 
and why this is an implausible and an unlikely explanation for the changed 
wishes of dementia patients. We have described the methodological 
problems with this explanation model, because response shift can only 
be demonstrated by self-reports, which dementia patients cannot provide. 
Besides these methodological problems, we have shown that response 
shift is also an implausible explanation for the change of opinion of 
dementia patients. Dementia patients do not choose what they forget, 
therefore what they still remember and the wishes they still express are 
not necessarily the ones that are normatively significant. We have argued 
that there is a difference between ‘choosing’ and ‘losing’ abilities and 
preferences. We have no reason to follow a prior preference that was 
chosen to be dropped, but it is less clear that the same thing can be said 
of a preference that is lost due to dementia. Even though a dementia 
patient might seem to behave similar as a person who has chosen to drop 
his former beliefs, it is highly questionable whether the dementia patient 
and the person who has willingly dropped his beliefs should also be 
treated in the same manner. A dementia patient loses the abilities to 
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care about his prior preferences, and should therefore not be treated the 
same as someone who choses to change his preferences. It is, according 
to us, a wrong conclusion and an oversimplification to say that the dementia
patient does no longer ‘care’ about the things that mattered when he 
was not yet demented. Not caring about something presupposes that 
the person could still care about this (MacGee 2014). The point here is 
not that the dementia patient does no longer care, but that he is no longer 
capable of caring about his prior values. 
We have argued that other explanations than response shift theory describe 
better why dementia patients seem to ‘oppose’ their prior preferences. 
Change in behaviour, or a change of preference of dementia patients is 
caused by the disease itself, rather than by adjustment to the disease. Prior 
preferences may carry significance beyond the patient’s competence, also 
when the patient has forgotten about them. Furthermore we have stated 
that it is erroneous to assume that one’s current wellbeing should always 
take precedence over all other values. A person drawing an advance 
directive has foreseen that he might not be able to live according to his 
preferences. It can be assumed that he signs this directive exactly to 
make sure he will still be treated according to these preferences and  
not according to his later wishes. 
THE METAPHYSICAL OBJECTION 
In this thesis we have not discussed the metaphysical objection extensively. 
Only in chapter 4, we briefly mention that we assume that a dementia 
patient is to be considered the same person he was before the onset of 
the cognitive impairment, no matter how much of his loss of memory or 
cognitive capacities he has lost. However, serious objections were raised 
against the assumption that the dementia patient is the same person as 
before the cognitive impairment. The person, who suffers from a neuro-
degenerative disease, loses properties necessary for retaining personal 
identity over time (Dresser 1986), thereby becoming a different moral 
person. This claim relies on the fact that a dementia patient can lose so 
much mental capacity that the patient’s past preferences and interests 
seem no longer attributable to the demented person (Dresser 1995; 
Buchanan and Brock 1989). This claim, that dementia causes disruption in 
identity, is based on a theory of personal identity in which psychological 
continuity is necessary for identity (or survival) over time. Psychological 
continuity consists in overlapping chains of psychological connectedness, 
like memories, intentions, beliefs, goals, desires and similarity of character 
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(Locke 1700; Parfit 1984). These psychological connections are indeed 
often affected by dementia; the dementia patient loses memories and may 
act very differently than before. Sometimes caretakers of dementia patients 
may express similar statements by arguing that their family member who 
suffers from dementia behaves not like himself or is not like the person 
used to be. However, these phrases are often not meant literally and thus 
are not a metaphysical statement about the person’s identity, but are 
meant to describe the distressing changes caused by dementia. 
Regarding advance directives, the metaphysical objection criticises the 
assumption that the writer of the advance directive and the dementia 
patient are one and the same person. Following the assumption that the 
writer of the advance directive and the dementia patient are different 
persons, it is argued that we have no reason to assume that the directive 
has any moral authority over the dementia patient. The wishes as described 
in the advance directive come from a different person, and are therefore 
not to be treated as his autonomous decisions, because we generally 
understand autonomy as the right to self-rule over your own life. If we 
accept the psychologically based theories of identity, we have good reasons 
to question the assumption that the writer of the advance directive is 
indeed the same as the dementia patient.
Even though the arguments based on the psychological criterion for per-
sonal identity are logically sound and from a philosophical perspective 
convincing, I think that the subsequently drawn conclusions on the lack 
of legitimacy of earlier expressed wishes in an ARD, are wrong. In medical 
ethics not only philosophical theories matter, but also clinical reality forms 
our understanding and practice. Therefore, even if we accept this theory of 
personal identity based on a psychological criterion, the question remains 
whether it should be leading for how we treat dementia patients. In other 
words: even though these objections exist, and might be right about the 
nature of identity, I still think we have good reasons to keep on treating 
dementia patients as the person they were before. First of all, I think that 
treating dementia patients as a new stranger is harmful. It is often reported 
that dementia patients benefit from mementoes from their past, from 
being around people they know, maintaining routines, and from listening 
to music they used to like (Brodaty 2012; Porock et al. 2015; Jacobsen 
et al. 2015; Baird & Samson 2015; Woods et al. 2005). Apparently, some 
memories or routines may be ‘hidden’ and can be awoken. Treating 
dementia patients as if they have become a different person, and dis-
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missing all their past experiences and preferences, is therefore a question-
able practice.
Secondly, the assumption that dementia patients lose their identity con-
tradicts our normal way of dealing with identity. In strong contrast to the 
criterion of personal identity, families do commonly not treat their demented 
relatives as strangers. In practice, most people whose (grand)mother has 
the unfortunate fate of suffering from dementia, keep on visiting her because 
she is to them still their (grand)mother. It does not matter whether she 
is acting differently from before and may not remember that she is their 
(grand)mother at all. We understand the changes rather as behaviour 
caused by dementia, than as her becoming a different person. Berghmans 
(2000) has described these two positions in a noteworthy manner: the 
first regards grandma as a demented person (losing her prior identity), 
the second regards grandma as a person with dementia (staying the same 
person, with changes due to the disease). 
The belief that identity remains preserved, regardless of the cognitive 
capacities, is also seen on the other end of a life span, as is described by 
Nelson (2007) and Schechtman (2014). Children develop emotionally, 
physically, psychologically and morally throughout their childhood. They 
mature, develop rational capacities, bear responsibilities and over time 
develop the abilities to reason and remember past event without any 
help of their parents. Even though these changes and abilities allow a 
child to constitute his own identity, in general we do not start treating 
this child as a new person. The child remains to be the same person as 
he was when he was fully dependent on his parents, and we understand 
the development of these characteristics as part of his own development. 
Arguably, it is precisely because we remain to treat this child as the same 
person that we allow him to develop coherent memories and beliefs about 
his life and values. I am not arguing here that the dementia patient 
becomes a child, but I think that the development of a child is a good 
illustration of how we in general understand identity. A child does not 
develop a new identity by gaining certain capacities; I find it therefore 
problematic to question the identity of dementia patients at the other 
end of the spectrum, because they lose certain cognitive capacities.
From a medical-ethical perspective, I would argue that what the child 
and the dementia patient have in common is their state of competence, 
rather than their absence of identity. The cognitive changes result in a 
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different moral status and not in a change of identity. As described in 
the introduction, competence is a concept that is not unproblematic. It 
raises many questions, for example how this should be decided and based 
on which properties one is to be deemed competent. The competence 
approach, however, does allow us to describe the cognitive decline of 
dementia patients, without raising questions about the dementia patient’s 
identity and therefore fits our general beliefs that (grand)mother is a 
patient with dementia, rather than a demented person. This model is also 
important for the following section concerning the epistemic objections, 
because competence plays a decisive role in the decision whether wishes 
should be followed or not. 
EPISTEMIC OBJECTIONS
The epistemic objection concerns the question that we do not know 
whether a dementia patient still has the same preferences and interests 
he had when the advance directive was written or whether he has renoun-
ced these in the meantime. Once the dementia patient becomes permanently 
incompetent and loses the abilities to express or confirm his earlier 
preferences and interests, it is hard to say that he still has those preferences 
and interests. This objection raises the question why prior preferences 
must trump the interests of an incompetent person’s current wishes. The 
problem here is inter-personal, within one person, instead of between two 
distinct persons, as described in the metaphysical objection. In chapter 
3 and 7 we have presented some of these epistemic questions. 
In chapter 7 we have dealt with the epistemic objection by Dresser (1986,
1995) and Robertson (1991), who argue that we cannot know what we 
want in the future because our needs and interests may have radically 
changed (Dresser 1986, 1995; Robertson 1991). It is questioned whether 
any competent person is ever fully able to anticipate the point of view 
of his incapacitated future version (Dresser 1995). We have argued against 
this viewpoint, since it remains unclear why the anticipatory character 
of the decision should imply that prior preferences are to be ignored 
altogether. Furthermore, we have argued that the possibility of being 
mistaken in hindsight is no reason to disregard the moral authority of an 
anticipatory decision. In general, we accept anticipatory decisions from 
competent persons, whether they are wrongly or rightly foreseen, and we 
do not understand why this should be different for competent dementia 
patients. But as we have stated, when dementia patients appear to have 
foreseen the decision to participate in reseach wrongly, this may be a 
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good reason to allow them a way out of the research. Extra safeguards 
are therefore required.
‘THE HAPPY DEMENTIA PATIENT’- EPISTEMIC OBJECTIONS FROM 
THE PUBLIC DEBATE
In the public debate a special epistemic objection can be found. Sometimes 
a ‘happy dementia patient’ is described (eg. Truijens 2011; Pels 1997). 
These arguments follow a line of thought that can be reconstructed as 
follows: you cannot know whether you will be unhappy as a dementia 
patient, or whether you will still enjoy your life and forget about the 
fears you had about a future of living with dementia. Because we do not 
know how our life with dementia will be, we should not bind ourselves 
with advance directives. 
During the observations I made in nursing homes and geriatric departments 
of the hospitals throughout my PhD research, I have not seen many 
dementia patients that seemed happy. I have not observed these patients 
with a specific concept of happiness in mind, and understand that doing 
research into happiness of dementia patients requires more than a simple 
observation. Furthermore, I did not aim to scientifically study happiness 
in dementia patients, making these observations only my personal impres-
sion. This impression is, that the chance that you will become a happy 
dementia patient is lower than to become an unhappy dementia patient, 
as also others have argued (den Hartogh 2012; Clare 2008). There is, 
however, only scarce empirical research conducted into happiness of 
dementia patients, due to the lack of reliable and valid ways to measure 
happiness (Shell 2015), and happiness is sometimes conflated with well-
being or quality of life (Gerritsen et al. 2010). Therefore, we do not know 
whether dementia patients that seem happy are indeed happy, and whether 
dementia patients that seem unhappy are indeed unhappy. The second 
assumption, that the experience of happiness of dementia patients is a 
reason not to draw an advance (care) directive or euthanasia directive 
is however flawed. A dementia patient in the more advanced stages 
cannot live according to his prior values anymore, and it is not evident 
that only wellbeing should matter to him (Nuffield 2009). The conclusion 
that wellbeing or observed happiness may overrule what someone has 
found important is therefore not evident. Of course, attempts are made 
to organise activities for these patients. Physicians, nurses and family 
member do their best to take care of the needs of the dementia patients, 
and sometimes succeed in letting them enjoy these activities, but that is 
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not the point here. Even if patients enjoy these activities, and experience 
happiness, due to dementia the possibilities to connect with others and 
to understand reality diminish, which is upsetting and frustrating for most 
dementia patients. 
Sometimes the argument is continued by the ‘soothing thought’ that after 
a while, dementia patients forget about their misfortune and sorrows, 
making the later phases of dementia ‘easier’. I think that also this argument 
is flawed, not only because the odds of becoming ‘a happy dementia 
patient’ might be low, but also because this argument assumes that for-
getting about your worries and prior values makes the reality of being 
demented less bad. Even if the momentary experience is without suffering, 
we can still argue that something bad has happened. An analogy might 
help here: while being dead is probably not an unpleasant experience, and 
even more plausible, not even an experience at all since you are dead 
and incapable of having experiences, we might still argue that something 
bad has happened to you when you pass away. The point is that not only 
the experience of something bad makes it a bad thing.
CRITICAL INTERESTS AND WISHES OF INCOMPETENT PERSONS
Dementia patients remain conscious and able to have subjective experiences, 
in contrast to deceased people. This raises the question how the wishes 
of these incompetent, but conscious persons should be balanced against 
the competent anticipated preferences. Should prior preferences always 
overrule? One of the most influential approaches to this issue is offered 
by Dworkin. Dworkin (1993) has argued that dementia patients might 
retain experiential interests (things people like because the experience 
of doing them), but the dementia patient cannot have any contemporary 
opinion regarding her critical interests (convictions about what helps to 
make a good life good on the whole). Dworkin argues that the experiential 
interests of dementia patients may be overruled by critical interests. This 
would imply that if there is a prior stated interest, this should overrule 
the current experiential wish of the dementia patients. In chapter 6 we 
have described that research participation is for most people not a ‘critical 
interest’. We have argued that a prior stated preference to participate 
might be considered a ‘declaration of willingness’. These declarations are 
valuable in the research context, because they capture an autonomous 
authorisation, but of course experiential interests matter too when research 
participants are more burdened than anticipated. In the next section of 
this discussion I will show what this means for the use of advance research 
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directives of dementia patients, and how we should balance prior given 
consent and dissent during the research trial. 
In this thesis we have paid specific attention to questions concerning 
research participation of dementia patients. There may be a variety of 
situations in which prior and current wishes seem to oppose each other. 
A balance between respecting precedent autonomy and promoting well-
being needs to be found in such situations. We have argued that autonomy 
is in particular important for research decisions, and well-being or therapeutic 
effects alone are not sufficient reason to include dementia patients in 
research trials. In other contexts the balance between autonomy and well-
being can be different, depending on the importance of the decisions, 
the strength of the expressed preferences and the amount of distress 
being caused (Nuffield Council 2009). 
To sum up, we have shown that it is wrong to assume that prior preferences 
do not matter anymore when the dementia patient expresses a different 
wish. The opposing wishes are caused by the disease, and are not to be 
understood as an ‘adaptation’ to the disease. Furthermore, we have shown 
that we have good reasons to treat a dementia patient as the person 
he was before, because it may benefit him and it better suits our beliefs 
about identity. We have argued that research participation should not be 
understood as a Dworkinean ‘critical interest’ for most people, therefore 
the experiential preferences of the research subject also matter. In the 
next section of the discussion, we will go deeper into the question how 
given consent and protection during the trial should be balanced.
III  ARE ADVANCE RESEARCH DIRECTIVES AN APPROPRIATE 
MEANS FOR DEMENTIA PATIENTS TO PROVIDE RESEARCH 
AUTHORIZATION?
In chapters 4 to 7, we have discussed the appropriateness of advance 
research directives in dementia research. In chapter 4 we have shown 
that ARDs can be integrated in the European legal framework, Chapter 5 
describes our empirical study regarding the arguments and opinions of 
researchers doing clinical research into dementia. In chapter 6 differences 
between advance directives in the care context and the context of research 
have been discussed and chapter 7 has shown that ARDs form a morally 
defensible ground for including incapacitated dementia patients in research 
trials. These perspectives will be brought together in this section in order 
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to answer the research question, but before I do that, I will frame the 
discussion regarding ARDs a bit broader. As we have seen in chapter 5, 6 
and 7, many arguments used for or against ARDs, are not specific for ARDs, 
but are also used for advance directives in the care context. There are thus 
objections against advance directives in general, but this has not prevented 
policy makes and clinicians to accept and use advance directives in the 
care context. We will start by having a closer look at advance care directives.
A BROADER SCOPE ON ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
The promotion of advance directives fits the overall efforts, ever since the 
end of the 1980’s, to support patients’ self-determination. In modern 
medical ethics and law it is firmly established that patients have the right 
to accept or refuse any medical treatment, even if this decision has 
severe adverse effects (eg. Biomedicine Convention 1997, article 9; UK 
Adult Refusal to Treatment Act 2002; The American PSDA 1999; the 
Dutch WGBO 1999). Advance directives in the health care context can 
have several forms, they can be a positive directive, meaning a written 
request for a treatment; or a negative directive, meaning a written refusal; 
or it can be directed at a proxy to make decisions on the behalf of the 
patient. Usually in the medical context, advance directive are treatment 
refusals, for example DNR (do not resuscitate) statements or refusal of 
life-sustaining treatments. These negative directives are legally binding, 
medical intervention is only allowed with the consent of the (competent) 
patient. Positive directives, on the contrary, are not legally binding, similarly 
treatment requests of competent persons do not necessarily have to be 
followed by physicians. That does not mean that these positive directives 
have no influence at all: physicians will take these positive directives into 
consideration when deciding what constitutes good care for this patient.
If the directive is in line with what is beneficial from a medical perspective, 
the directive may be followed.
Advance care directives have been criticised for being only of limited use 
in practice. Both physicians and proxies usually have positive attitudes 
towards advance care directives; however, the directives are rarely complied 
with and appear to only marginally influence the decision-making process 
(Perkins 2007; Bond and Lowton, 2011; De Boer et al. 2012). A recently 
published systematic review has shown that the completion rate of advance 
directives is in general low (below 30%), but higher for elderly who are 
(seriously) ill (53%) (Oulton et al. 2015). This same review described that 
emergency medicine practitioners in the United States have access to the 
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advance directives in 46% of the cases, meaning that even if advance 
directives exist, only in about half of the cases these are accessible for 
care providers in emergency situations. Another review regarding the role 
of nurses in advance care planning describes some problems regarding 
the elderly population in advance care planning (Ke et al. 2015). The authors 
report that nurses have concerns that elderly might be more focussed on 
the past than on the future, that elderly might have difficulties to concentrate 
due to cognitive decline or have sensory-impairments, which limit the 
possibilities to inform them adequately. Nevertheless, nurses were optimistic 
about their possible contribution to implement and increase the uptake 
of advance care directives. Another review explained that advance care 
planning for community dwelling elderly is not systematically approached, 
which may explain why there is only a low uptake of advance directives 
in this population (Glaudemans et al. 2015). Also cultural factors have been 
reported to influence the acceptance of advance care planning (Sanchez-
Gonzalez 1997; Schicktanz 2009; Ke et al. 2015); the acceptability of planning 
the end of life and the extent to which this is an individual matter varies 
among countries and cultures. 
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES IN THE RESEARCH CONTEXT
In chapters 6 and 7 we have discussed the differences between the 
research context and the care context. We have argued that the research 
context differs fundamentally from the care context, because of its aims: 
the main aim of treatment is to benefit the patient, whereas the main 
aim of research is not primarily to benefit the research participants, but 
to generate knowledge. While for treatment in some cases the will of 
the patient may be overruled, it is never allowed to include a research 
participant in a trial without his consent. Anticipated therapeutic effects 
alone are not enough reason to justify research participation. Authorisation 
is necessary, even if it is likely that a trial will benefit the participant. 
In chapter 4, we have seen that the European legal framework for bio-
medical research, as well as domestic laws, do not set specific legal criteria 
for ARDs. This in contrast to advance care directives, which are widely 
recognized in domestic and international law. ARDs do thus not have a 
clear legal status in Europe yet. However, as we have shown, there is no 
explicit legal objection against the use of ARDs either, and ARDs can be 
integrated in the existing legal framework in Europe. In this chapter we 
stated ethical questions that need to be addressed in order to specify 
the scope and use of ARDs: how detailed must the participant be informed? 
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What is the weight of the opinion of the proxy before and during the 
research? Does the use of ARDs provide the possibility to prospectively 
consent to participation in trials that exceed minimal risk and minimal 
burden? In chapter 7, we have taken a normative position regarding these 
questions, by stating that an ARD must - like informed consent - be based 
on sufficient information instead of full information; if the information is 
out-dated, the moral force of the ARD may be lessened. Regarding the 
role of the proxy we have stated that support from the proxy remains 
necessary, albeit for logistical support and their consent is, from a moral 
perspective, not required for valid consent. Our position differs from the 
legal standard, in which the consent from a proxy is deemed necessary 
for research with incompetent research subjects. We have argued in 
chapter 7 that this legal standard fails to do justice to the moral aim of 
respect for autonomy, because the research participant himself has no 
saying in the decision-making process. The current legal standard offers 
protection for vulnerable populations, but leaves only little room for 
individual preferences. We find it problematic that there is currently only 
limited attention to the moral aim of autonomous authorization of dementia 
patients. Furthermore, we have stated that ARDs should allow for more 
than minimal risk studies, because the consent is given by a competent 
person, and in general we allow competent persons to consent to more 
than minimal risk-studies. 
In chapter 5, we have seen that researchers in the field of dementia do 
not fully agree with our opinion that ARDs are a valuable tool. The inter-
viewed researchers have argued that informed consent is too complex to 
anticipate, they have expressed worries about the possibility that research 
participants change their mind (epistemic objection), and have stated that 
they prefer the consent of a proxy. The researchers have stated that a 
negative directive would be followed in practice, but a positive ARD 
would, according to them, not be sufficient for research authorisation. 
Overall, the interviewed researchers seemed to be more concerned with 
protection than with questions of autonomy and valid authorisation. We 
have also reported that there is a low uptake of advance research directives, 
but contrary to the uptake of advance care directives, it is not so clear 
what the underlying causes and mechanisms are. 
This raises the question how we should deal with practical problems such 
as the little support that the interviewed researchers provide for the use 
of ARDs as a research authorisation. I agree with John Davis (2007) that 
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if advance directives would lack moral authority, then there is no reason 
to focus on the practical problems, whereas if they have moral authority, 
there is all the more reason to strive to solve the practical problems. We 
have argued in chapter 7 why advance directives have moral authority, 
and therefore in our view there are reasons to aim for overcoming the 
practical problems as those raised by the interviewed researchers. We 
agree with the interviewed researchers that protection during the trial is 
necessary, but we do not think that this is an issue related to the use of 
ARDs. We have argued in chapter 7, that the question how we organise 
protection is also there when proxies provide consent. Possibly, the 
researchers that we have interviewed were influenced in their answers 
by the legal standard for advance care directives, in which refusals need 
to be respected, but positive directives not necessarily. We have argued 
in chapter 7 that the legal standard of proxy consent is a poor means to 
extend the voice of the participant in the decision-making process, that 
the proxy finds this role burdensome, and that it is a less robust authorisation, 
because it is not consent by the person himself. However, we can understand 
the preferences of researchers, and would agree that it is probably helpful 
if a proxy is part of the decision-making process, but for practical rather 
than for moral reasons. 
The epistemic objection, that dementia patients might ‘change their mind’ 
about their decision, is also raised by the interviewed researchers. This 
has already been discussed extensively in the prior section. We can add 
to that, that it is remarkable that on the one hand researchers stress the 
vulnerability of this population due to their cognitive decline, but on the 
other hand they seem to argue that we should follow the wishes of in-
competent persons. This is not coherent in our opinion. We have offered a 
more precise approach by stating that we recognize the need for protection 
during the trial, even if there is a positive ARD. As we have stated in 
chapter 7, dementia patients might wrongly foresee the decision to 
participate in research, because they underestimate the burden. This is 
no reason however to disregard the moral authority of the ARD, but a 
reason to provide dementia patients a way out when they are burdened 
more than they anticipated. ARDs can help by authorising research par-
ticipation, but we should provide protection to research subjects once 
they become incompetent. We continued by arguing that a dementia 
patient might want to be careful with his future self, who will be more 
vulnerable and less able to carry burden, but that the decision how much 
burden they are willing to bear and to what extent the current person’s 
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interests may be compromised, should remain up to himself. 
To sum up, ARDs are an appropriate means for dementia patients to 
consent to research, from both a moral and a legal perspective. Researchers 
do not seem convinced by the use of ARDs, therefore the introduction of 
ARDs might face practical problems. ARDs will allow dementia patients 
to have a voice in the decision-making process and allow for individual 
choices; therefore it is desirable to introduce ARDs into practice to overcome 
limitations of dementia research caused by the lack of autonomous 
authorisation. 
METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS AND REMAINING QUESTIONS
Medical ethics is an interdisciplinary field of study, requiring methods 
to study medical practice, law, philosophy, bioethics and policy. I have 
sought interaction with a wide range of researchers and care providers 
in order to gain insight into the relevant aspects of dementia research. 
We arranged an expert-meeting (See Appendix I for the participants), I 
visited several dementia centres, nursing homes and geriatric departments, 
that provided me with valuable insight in the clinical practice of physicians 
and researchers, as well as providing me the opportunity to have 
conversations with dementia patients. From workshops, conferences and 
reading groups, I have gained relevant and useful information for a practical 
ethical approach to my topic, also and especially by working and writing 
together with a variety of co-authors with diverse backgrounds and expertise. 
We have published in medical, legal and bioethical journals, and have 
managed to reach relevant audiences.
We have discussed some important ethical questions in the context of 
dementia research and the appropriateness of ARDs in this thesis, but 
there are some remaining questions. An important perspective is missing 
in our research. I have been writing about elderly and dementia patients, 
but I have not conducted empirical research with this population myself 
for this dissertation. Others have conducted research with elderly and with 
dementia patients in order to describe their ideas regarding research 
participation (Kim et al. 2005; Ayalon 2009; Wendler et al. 2002; Karlawish 
2009), proxy consent (Kim et al. 2009; Stocking et al. 2006; Kim et al. 
2013; Karlawish et al. 2009; de Vries et al. 2013) and advance directives 
(Muthappan et al. 2005; Stocking 2006; Bravo et al. 2002). Unfortunately,
in our project, there was neither time nor the financial means to conduct 
empirical research with dementia patients. We do acknowledge the 
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importance to give patients a voice and listen to them when making 
policy and doing research that affects him. We strongly recommend to 
conduct empirical research with this population to explore their opinion 
and arguments concerning topics in research ethics and more particularly 
in regard of the use of ARDs. Also the implementation of ARDs in practice 
deserves to be studied further. Additionally, in this thesis we have reflected 
upon the question how research with dementia patients should be con-
ducted; the question which types or aims of research are desirable, has 
not received much attention, but remains an important question.
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
On the basis of our ethical interpretation and evaluation of advance 
directives in dementia research, we have come to the following conclusions 
and recommendations:
Recommendations for policy
−    The use of ambiguous inclusion- and exclusion criteria in research 
protocols, that limit the internal and external validity of research, 
should not be accepted by institutional review boards. 
−    The ethical and legal research guidelines should include specific 
conditions for research participants with dementia, in order to respect 
the morally significant particularities of this group.
−    Governments should promote measures to facilitate the use of ARDs 
in the context of dementia research to give dementia patients a voice 
in decisions regarding research participation.
−    ARDs should be made legally valid to provide consent to research 
participation.
 
Recommendations for researchers and clinicians
−    There is a strong focus on research into Alzheimer’s disease, but 
other subtypes of dementia should be studied too, in order to let all 
dementia patients benefit from scientific progress.
−    Research into the optimization of the informed consent process for 
people with cognitive impairments is desirable, so that they can make 
their own decisions about research participation as long as possible.
−    The possibility of drawing an ARD should be brought to the attention 
of competent dementia patients in order to discuss research partici-
pation with the patient and proxy.
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−    Cognitive impairment does not imply exclusion from decision-making, 
therefore it is important to give dementia patients a voice in the 
informed consent process. 
−    The decision of a proxy should not be followed blindly, he might be 
mistaken about the research participant’s wishes.
−    ARDs should be taken seriously, because they capture decisions of 
autonomous persons.
 
Recommendations for (future) dementia patients
−    Anticipation to future incompetence is required when a say in future 
decisions is desired. 
−    To raise the chance of having influence on future decisions, preferences
should be written down in an A(R)D.
−    Advance directives are often not a ‘one-off’ event, begin early with 
planning and the directives and underlying ideas should be discussed 
with physicians, caretakers and researchers. 
−    Caretakers should get clear instructions regarding future wishes, and 
regarding the extent to which they are granted leeway.
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Summary
The participation of dementia patients in clinical research is necessary for 
the development of more effective diagnostic instruments and therapeutic 
interventions. However, it is also important that their participation is 
based on appropriate consent regimes. Patients with dementia face an 
increased risk of becoming incompetent to provide informed consent. In 
most countries, the legal possibilities for doing research with incapacitated 
research subjects are limited and require the consent of a legal represen-
tative. These measures also have clear downsides: they restrict the 
possibilities of doing research with dementia patients, participation is 
not based upon autonomous authorisation of the research participant 
and decisions made by legal representatives do not necessarily conform 
to what the patients chose whilst still competent. Given the often slowly 
progressive nature of dementia, and the possibility to anticipate future 
incompetence, we suggest letting dementia patients anticipate future 
incompetence by signing an Advance Research Directive (ARD). In an 
ARD the dementia patient could describe his preferences concerning 
future research participation. 
ARDs in the context of dementia have propelled ethical and regulatory 
discussions among researchers, clinicians and policy-makers, about the 
acceptability of advance directives in general, the feasibility of ARDs and 
the conditions under which ARDs would be morally acceptable. In this 
dissertation, ethical issues in dementia research, and more specifically 
concerning the use of ARDs as an authorisation tool are discussed. 
Chapter 1 describes dementia research and its inclusion and exclusion 
criteria. Research with dementia patients brings about some unique 
challenges that influence the generalisability of the research results. If 
the validity and generalisability of the findings from biomedical research 
are weak, patients cannot benefit from these studies. In this chapter an 
overview and analysis of dementia research and its exclusion criteria is 
provided, in order to get a clearer picture whether the research findings 
may be extrapolated to the general dementia population. We analysed 
all research protocols recorded in toetsingonline. It is shown that the 
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distribution of dementia research among the different types of dementia 
does not correspond with the prevalence of these dementia subtypes in 
the patient population. Moreover, it is shown that the research participants 
are not representative of the population of dementia patients. In this chapter 
we advice that the research agenda should be more closely aligned with 
the disease prevalence and include a better representation of the dementia 
patients in research in order to meet the needs of these patients.
 
The current legal framework is rather restrictive with respect to the 
inclusion of vulnerable populations in clinical research trials. In chapter 2 
we analyse the specific articles regulating research with incompetent 
populations in legal documents and ethical guidelines. Interestingly, some 
of the available laws and guidelines differentiate between groups of 
incapacitated adults and children, while others set generic requirements 
for all populations unable to consent. In this chapter we point out the 
morally relevant similarities and differences between the groups, and 
describe whether ethical and legal guidelines take these into account. 
We argue that it is important to allow both groups shared-decision making 
in the phase that they have limited decision-making skills. Moreover, we 
have argued that accepting higher levels of risks and burdens for one 
of the groups is not justified. Furthermore, we recommend to seriously 
consider formerly expressed wishes of dementia patients, for example 
those documented in advance research directives.
Chapter 3 elaborates on situations where wishes of dementia patients 
contradict earlier stated preferences. How we understand these contra-
dictions has important consequences for how we deal with advance 
directives. Some bioethicists and gerontologists have argued that dementia 
patients adapt to their illness, and argue that a ‘response shift’ causes 
dementia patients to change their mind. In this chapter we show that the 
assumption that dementia patients undergo a response shift is flawed and 
implausible. Proponents of the ‘response-shift view’ use the term in an 
imprecise manner. On top of that, response shift is implausible in the case 
of dementia. We argue that the disease dictates the change in wishes. 
Dementia patients who lose the ability to care about prior wishes should 
not be treated the same as people who choose to drop prior values. We 
propose that the change of wishes should not be understood as a response 
shift and conclude that advance directives of dementia patients cannot 
be simply put aside.
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In Chapter 4, the legal possibilities for integrating ARDs in the European 
legal framework are discussed. In this chapter it is shown that the Euro-
pean legal framework for biomedical research is currently virtually silent 
about the use of ARDs. Also, most European domestic laws do not set 
specific legal criteria for the use of ARDs. Therefore, ARDs do not yet have 
a clear legal status in Europe. There is, however, also no explicit legal 
objection against the use of ARDs. Our considerations in this chapter 
indicate the possibilities for the integration of ARDs within the existing 
European legal framework. Additional clarification for the use of ARDs is 
however required. The legal norms should adequately address the level 
of information required for an ARD, give guidance regarding objections 
of dementia patients with a positive ARD, and should provide guidance 
for the level of acceptable risks and burdens.
Chapter 5 shows our empirical study concerning the opinions and 
arguments of researchers in the field of dementia. Several critical remarks 
were made about the extent and the conditions under which ARDs can 
be valuable. Advance directives are only considered useful in practice if 
the researcher knows how to interpret the document; therefore a close 
relation to the patient is required. Furthermore, researchers seem to be 
concerned about patients that might change their mind about their earlier 
written decision. They raise the questions whether the advance directive 
is still applicable to the person the dementia patient has become and 
whether the directive truly represents what the patient wants. An ARD is 
considered useful to help the proxies in their decision-making. In general 
it is agreed that a negative advance directive should be followed, but 
that a positive ARD alone is not sufficient. In practice, proxy dissent will 
overrule a positive directive and the researchers argue that dissent or 
objection of the patient should overrule the advance directive. 
In chapter 6, it is demonstrated that the research context differs from the 
health care context. While for treatment in some cases the will of the 
patient may be overruled, it is never allowed to include a research partici-
pant in a trial without his consent. Possible therapeutic effects alone are 
not enough reason to justify research participation. Authorisation is neces-
sary, even if it is likely that a trial will benefit the participant; this underlines 
the difference between research and treatment. Furthermore, we argue 
that for most people, research participation is not a Dworkenean ‘critical 
interest’. An ARD may therefore not overrule all ‘experiential interests’. 
We propose that these documents should rather be understood as ‘a 
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declaration of willingness to participate’, that functions as an initial autho-
rization, but protection during the trial is also required.
Chapter 7 shows why ARDs morally justify the inclusion of incapacitated 
dementia patients in research trials. Consent to participation in research 
is ideally based on informed, free and competent authorisation, by an 
agent who has ‘here and now’ autonomy. This ideal is out of reach for 
incapacitated dementia patients, as they are no longer competent. 
Patients with dementia are characterized by the fact that, at an earlier 
stage of their life, they were able to give their consent to participation in 
research. Therefore the phase in which patients are still competent to 
decide, offers a valuable opportunity to authorise research by using an 
Advance Research Directive (ARD). The current legal standard for including 
incompetent research subjects in research trials requires the consent of 
the legal representative, but fails to do justice to the moral aim of respect 
for autonomy. ARDs offer dementia patients a way to control their life 
beyond their own competence. After authorisation, protection remains 
necessary during the trial. Researchers should remain cautious not to 
burden incompetent research participants more than was anticipated. 
The remaining issues of using advance directives for research subjects 
with dementia do not question the ARD as an authorisation tool, but 
have to do with withdrawal and resistance. We conclude that both aims 
of respect for persons, authorisation and protection, are served when 
ARDs are used to authorise research participation, as long as there remain 
extra precautions during the trial. 
Our final chapter, the general discussion, summarizes and discusses 
the main findings of this thesis. Here it is discussed that the biomedical 
model gives a reductionist view of dementia and the social dimension of 
dementia also deserves to be studied. I describe that a multidisciplinary 
approach is required, in order to study all relevant aspects of dementia, 
and in order to take care of dementia patients. I also discuss the meta-
physical objection regarding the personal identity of dementia patients, 
and epistemological objections regarding the anticipation of future wishes. 
I argue that even if dementia would cause a fundamental change in the 
identity of the dementia patients, we have good reasons to treat the 
dementia patient as the person he always was. Furthermore I show that 
the anticipatory character of a decision is no reason to question the moral 
authority of a decision. Finally, we show that ARDs form a morally and 
legally acceptable basis for the inclusion of dementia patients in research 
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trials. Researchers do not seem convinced by the use of ARDs, therefore 
the introduction of ARDs might face practical problems. ARDs will how-
ever allow dementia patients to have a voice in the decision-making 
process. They also give room to individual choices. It is therefore desirable 
to introduce them into practice, thus allowing limitations of dementia 
research caused by the lack of autonomous authorisation to be overcome. 
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Samenvatting
De deelname van patiënten met dementie aan medisch-wetenschappelijk 
onderzoek is nodig om effectievere diagnostische instrumenten en 
behandelingen te ontwikkelen. Het is tegelijkertijd ook van groot belang 
dat de toestemming voor deelname aan onderzoek goed is geregeld. 
Patiënten met dementie hebben een verhoogd risico om wilsonbekwaam 
te worden en kunnen dan geen geïnformeerde toestemming meer geven. 
In de meeste landen zijn de juridische mogelijkheden voor het doen van 
onderzoek met wilsonbekwame proefpersonen beperkt en is de toestem-
ming van een wettelijke vertegenwoordiger vereist. Deze maatregelen 
hebben ook duidelijke nadelen: ze beperken de mogelijkheden om onder-
zoek te doen met dementie patiënten, deelname is niet gebaseerd op 
autonome toestemming van de proefpersoon en de besluiten van wettelijk 
vertegenwoordigers zijn niet altijd in overeenstemming met wat de patiënt 
zelf zou kiezen. Aangezien dementie vaak langzaam maar progressief 
verloopt, en gezien de mogelijkheid om te anticiperen op toekomstige 
wilsonbekwaamheid, onderzoeken we de mogelijkheid om patiënten met 
dementie te laten anticiperen op hun toekomstige wilsonbekwaamheid 
door het opstellen van een Advance Research Directive (ARD). In een 
ARD zou de patiënt met dementie zijn voorkeuren met betrekking tot 
toekomstige deelname onderzoek kunnen beschrijven.
ARDs van patiënten met dementie roepen ethische en juridische vragen 
op voor wetenschappers, artsen en beleidsmakers, over de aanvaardbaar-
heid van wilsverklaringen in het algemeen, de haalbaarheid van ARDs en 
over de voorwaarden waaronder ARDs moreel aanvaardbaar zijn. In dit 
proefschrift worden ethische kwesties bij dementie onderzoek besproken, 
en meer in het bijzonder vragen met betrekking tot het gebruik van ARDs 
als een manier om toestemming te geven voor medisch wetenschappelijk 
onderzoek. 
Hoofdstuk 1 bespreekt het gebruik van inclusie en exclusiecriteria in 
dementie onderzoek. Onderzoek met patiënten met dementie brengt een 
aantal unieke uitdagingen met zich mee, die de generaliseerbaarheid van 
de onderzoeksresultaten beïnvloeden. Als de bevindingen uit het medisch 
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wetenschappelijk onderzoek verminderd generaliseerbaar of niet betrouw-
baar zijn, kunnen patiënten niet profiteren van de resultaten van deze 
studies. In dit hoofdstuk wordt een overzicht gegeven en een analyse 
gedaan van de karakteristieken van het dementie onderzoek en de 
gebruikte inclusie- en exclusiecriteria, om een duidelijker beeld te krijgen 
of de onderzoeksresultaten kunnen worden geëxtrapoleerd naar de 
populatie patiënten met dementie. De analyse laat zien dat de verdeling 
van onderzoek over de subtypen van dementie niet overeenkomt met 
de prevalentie van deze soorten dementie in de patiëntenpopulatie. 
Bovendien laten we zien dat de onderzoeksparticipanten niet represen-
tatief zijn voor de bredere populatie van mensen met dementie. In dit 
hoofdstuk adviseren wij om de onderzoeksagenda beter af te stemmen op 
de prevalentie van de subtypen dementie en om de onderzoeksdeelnemers 
representatief te laten zijn voor de heterogene groep patiënten met demen-
tie, zodat het onderzoek deze groep patiënten ten goede kan komen.
 
Het huidige wettelijke kader is vrij restrictief met betrekking tot deelname 
van kwetsbare groepen in medisch wetenschappelijk onderzoek. In hoofd-
stuk 2 analyseren we de specifieke vereisten van juridische documenten 
en ethische richtlijnen die onderzoeksdeelname van wilsonbekwame 
groepen reguleren. Opmerkelijk is dat een aantal wetten en richtlijnen 
vereisten hebben die gelden voor alle groepen wilsonbekwamen, terwijl 
andere richtlijnen onderscheid maken tussen kinderen en wilsonbekwame 
volwassenen. Deze richtlijnen stellen specifieke eisen voor wilsonbekwame 
volwassenen en andere specifieke vereisten voor kinderen. In dit hoofd-
stuk wijzen wij op de moreel relevante overeenkomsten en verschillen 
tussen kinderen en patiënten met dementie en bekijken we of ethische 
en juridische richtlijnen deze verschillen en overeenkomsten voldoende 
erkennen. Wij stellen dat het belangrijk is om beide groepen een fase van 
gedeelde besluitvorming toe te staan en dat het accepteren van grotere 
risico’s en belasting voor een van de groepen niet gerechtvaardigd is. 
Verder adviseren we om rekening te houden met eerder uitgedrukte 
wensen van patiënten met dementie, bijvoorbeeld de wensen uitgedrukt 
in een ARD.
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat in op situaties waarin de wensen van mensen met 
dementie botsen met eerdere voorkeuren. Hoe wij de tegenstelling 
tussen wensen en voorkeuren begrijpen heeft belangrijke gevolgen voor 
de manier waarop we omgaan met wilsverklaringen. Sommige bio-ethici 
en gerontologen hebben betoogd dat patiënten met dementie zich aan-
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passen aan hun ziekte, en argumenteren dat een ‘response shift’ de 
oorzaak is van de verandering van wensen. In dit hoofdstuk hebben we 
laten zien dat de veronderstelling dat patiënten met dementie een response 
shift ondergaan niet klopt en ongeloofwaardig is. Voorstanders van de 
‘response-shift benadering’ gebruiken de term onnauwkeurig en een 
response shift is onwaarschijnlijk in het geval van dementie. Wij stellen 
dat de verandering van de wensen wordt gedicteerd door de ziekte en 
dat patiënten met dementie die de mogelijkheid hebben verloren om 
eerdere wensen belangrijk te vinden, niet hetzelfde zijn als mensen die 
ervoor kiezen eerdere wensen niet meer belangrijk te vinden. Wij stellen 
dat de verandering van de wensen van patiënten met dementie niet 
simpelweg kan worden opgevat als een gevolg van een response shift 
en concluderen dat wilsverklaringen van demente patiënten niet zonder-
meer terzijde geschoven kunnen worden.
In hoofdstuk 4 zijn de juridische mogelijkheden om ARDs in het Europees
juridisch kader te integreren besproken. In dit hoofdstuk wordt aangetoond 
dat het Europees wettelijk kader voor medisch wetenschappelijk onder-
zoek niets regelt met betrekking tot het gebruik van ARDs. Ook hebben 
de meeste nationale wetten in Europa geen specifieke wettelijke criteria 
opgesteld voor het gebruik van ARDs. ARDs hebben dus nog geen duidelijke 
juridische status in Europa. Er zijn echter ook geen expliciete juridische 
bezwaren tegen het gebruik van ARDs. In dit hoofdstuk geven we de 
mogelijkheden aan voor de integratie van ARDs binnen het bestaande 
Europees juridische kader. De wettelijke normen zullen duidelijkheid 
moeten verschaffen over de mate van informatie die nodig is voor een 
ARD, moeten richtinggevend zijn wanneer een patiënt met dementie 
zich verzet tegen onderzoeksprocedures maar wel positieve ARD heeft, 
en moeten bepalen wat aanvaardbare risico’s en belasting zijn.
Hoofdstuk 5 toont ons empirisch onderzoek naar de meningen en argu-
menten van dementie onderzoekers. Diverse kritische opmerkingen werden 
gemaakt over de mate en de voorwaarden waaronder ARDs waardevol 
kunnen zijn. Een wilsverklaring is enkel praktisch bruikbaar als de onder-
zoeker weet hoe het document geïnterpreteerd moet worden. Een goede 
band met de patiënt is daarvoor noodzakelijk. De meeste onderzoekers 
lijken bezorgd dat patiënten met dementie hun eerdere beslissing zullen 
herzien. Daardoor twijfelen de onderzoekers of de wilsverklaring nog 
steeds van toepassing is op de patiënt met dementie en of het document 
nog steeds representeert wat de patiënt wil als hij wilsonbekwaam is. 
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Een ARD wordt wel nuttig geacht om de vertegenwoordigers te helpen 
bij hun beslissingen. In het algemeen wordt gesteld dat een negatieve 
wilsverklaring moet worden gevolgd, maar dat een positieve ARD niet 
voldoende is om toestemming voor onderzoek te verlenen. In de praktijk 
zal toestemming van een vertegenwoordiger een positieve wilsverklaring 
overrulen, en de onderzoekers stellen dat verzet van de patiënt de wils-
verklaring moet overrulen.
In hoofdstuk 6 laten we zien dat de onderzoekscontext verschilt van de 
zorgcontext. Voor een behandeling mag in sommige gevallen de wil van 
de patiënt worden overstemd, maar in onderzoek is het nooit toegestaan 
om iemand te includeren zonder zijn expliciete toestemming. Mogelijke 
therapeutische effecten zijn niet voldoende reden om deelname aan 
onderzoek te rechtvaardigen. Toestemming is noodzakelijk, ook als het 
waarschijnlijk is dat het onderzoek de participant ten goede zal komen; 
dit onderstreept het verschil tussen onderzoek en zorg. Verder stellen wij 
dat voor de meeste mensen onderzoekdeelname geen Dworkeniaanse 
‘critical interest’ is, en daarom niet alle ‘experiential interests’ mag over-
stemmen. Wij denken dat een ARD moet worden begrepen als ‘een ver-
klaring van bereidheid om aan onderzoek deel te nemen’, die functioneert 
als een initiële toestemming, maar bescherming tijdens het onderzoek 
blijft ook noodzakelijk. 
Hoofdstuk 7 laat zien waarom ARDs moreel aanvaardbaar zijn voor de
deelname van dementie patiënten aan medisch wetenschappelijk onder-
zoek. Toestemming voor deelname aan onderzoek is idealiter gebaseerd 
op geïnformeerde, vrije toestemming, door een persoon die ‘hier en nu’ 
autonomie heeft. Dit ideaal is buiten het bereik van wilsonbekwame 
patiënten met dementie, want ze hebben de capaciteiten om toestemming 
te geven verloren. Patiënten met dementie worden gekenmerkt door 
het feit dat zij in een eerder stadium van hun leven wel geïnformeerde 
toestemming konden geven. Daarom is deze fase waarin de patiënten 
nog wilsbekwaam zijn een waardevolle kans om toestemming te geven 
voor onderzoek met behulp van een ARD. De huidige juridische norm 
voor de deelname van wilsonbekwame proefpersonen in onderzoek 
vereist de toestemming van de wettelijke vertegenwoordiger, maar slaagt 
er niet in om de autonomie van de proefpersoon te respecteren. Het is 
opmerkelijk dat er slechts beperkt aandacht wordt besteed aan de morele 
dimensie van de autonome toestemming in het geval van dementie 
onderzoek. ARDs bieden patiënten met dementie een mogelijkheid om 
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invloed te houden op hun leven als ze wilsonbekwaam worden. Naast 
toestemming, is ook bescherming nodig tijdens het onderzoek. Onder-
zoekers moeten monitoren of wilsonbekwame onderzoeksparticipanten 
niet meer dan verwacht belast worden. De resterende kwesties voor het 
gebruik van wilsverklaringen voor proefpersonen met dementie hebben 
niet te maken met vragen rondom toestemming maar hebben te maken 
met het terugtrekken uit onderzoek en met verzet. We concluderen dat 
de morele dimensies van respect voor personen; toestemming en bescher-
ming, worden gediend met het gebruik van ARDs, zolang er extra voorzorgs-
maatregelen worden genomen tijdens het onderzoek.
Tenslotte worden in de discussie de belangrijkste bevindingen van dit 
proefschrift samengevat en besproken. Het biomedische model geeft 
slechts een reductionistisch beeld van dementie, ook de sociale dimensie 
van dementie dient bestudeerd te worden. Een multidisciplinaire aanpak 
nodig is om alle relevantie dimensies van dementie te onderzoeken en 
goede zorg te kunnen verlenen aan dementie patiënten. De metafysische 
argumenten met betrekking tot persoonlijke identiteit van mensen met 
dementie, en epistemologische bezwaren met betrekking tot de antici-
patie op toekomstige wensen worden ook besproken. We stellen dat zelfs 
als dementie een fundamentele verandering in de identiteit van de 
dementerenden zou veroorzaken, we goede redenen hebben om de 
patiënt met dementie te beschouwen als dezelfde persoon die hij altijd 
was. Verder laten we zien dat het anticiperende karakter van een beslis-
sing geen reden is om het morele gezag van deze beslissing in twijfel te 
trekken. Tot slot, laten we zien dat ARDs een moreel en juridisch aanvaard-
bare basis vormen voor de deelname van patiënten met dementie in 
medisch-wetenschappelijk onderzoek. Dementie onderzoekers lijken niet 
overtuigd van het nut van ARDs, derhalve zal de invoering van ARDs voor 
praktische problemen kunnen zorgen. Een ARD stelt een patiënt met 
dementie in staat een stem in de besluitvorming te houden en zorgt ervoor 
dat individuele verschillen geuit kunnen worden. ARDs zijn daarom bruik-
baar en een goede oplossing om beperkingen, door het gebrek aan 
autonome toestemming, op te heffen in dementie onderzoek.
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